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Abstract

This chapter
chapter first discusses
discusses what economists mean
mean by "the incidence of agricultural
agricultural
policy" and why we care about it. Then it reviews models of the determinants
determinants of the
differential
differential incidence of different policies among interest
interest groups such as suppliers
suppliers
of factors of production,
production, consumers,
consumers, middlemen,
middlemen, taxpayers, and others. Results
Results are
represented
represented in terms of
of Marshallian
Marshaltian economic surplus,
surplus, and surplus
surplus transformation
transformation
curves. After reviewing the results from standard
under restrictive
standard models under
restrictive assumptions,
assumptions,
certain
certain assumptions
assumptions are relaxed
relaxed in order to analyze the effects of imperfect supply
policies, and the dynamics
controls, variability, cheating
cheating and imperfect
imperfect enforcement
enforcement of policies,
of supply.
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1. Introduction
Introduction
1.
W
Why
h y study
study policy incidence?
incidence? One
One reason
reason is that
that the
the economic
economic welfare
welfare effects of
of policies
are intrinsically interesting. In
In addition, the
the distribution of
of the
the resulting
resulting benefits
benefits and
and
central to understanding
understanding why
why particular
particular policies are
are chosen;
chosen; and
and it is also useful,
useful,
costs is central
in
in some
some settings, for prescribing policies. Whether
Whether we
we are interested
interested primarily in
in the
the
causes or
or in
in the
the consequences
consequences of
of policies, it is often
often appropriate to go
go beyond
beyond the
the most
most
causes
aggregative summary
Harberger triangles of
of
summary measures
measures reported
reported in
in some
some studies, such
such as Harberger
deadweight loss, to consider
consider the
the welfare
welfare effects
effects on
on particular
particular groups
groups in
in society.
deadweight
In the
the analysis of
of agricultural commodity
commodity policies, for instance,
instance, it is ccommon
In
o m m o n to
between the
the effects
effects on
on welfare
welfare of
of agricultural producers
producers and
and the
the effects
effects on
on
distinguish between
other economic
economic agents. The
The economic
economic effects
effects of
of policies are then
then represented
represented in
in terms
terms
other
of the
the costs and
and benefits
benefits to producers
producers as aa group
group and
and to other
other groups
groups in
in society (i.e., the
the
of
and the net
on society as a whole
sum of
of the
whole (the sum
the effects
distributional effects), and
net effects on
on producers
producers and
When
we talk about the incidence of
and others).
others), w
h e n we
of agricultural policy, then,
we
and benefits of
of the policy among
among different
we usually mean
mean the
the distribution of the costs and
interest groups, defined in terms
terms of their roles as consumers,
consumers, taxpayers, or producers (or
suppliers of factors of
o f production).
consumer surplus
It is conventional in commodity policy analysis to use
use Marshallian consumer
as a measure
measure of
consumer
welfare
change,
as
an
approximation
of
the
more
of consumer
change,
of
more theoretically
on
correct Hicksian welfare measures, implicitly presuming
presuming the bias is small, based
based on
arguments
arguments from Willig (1976).
(1976). In addition, it is conventional to explicitly or implicitly
invoke Harberger's (1971)
(1971) "Three
"Three Postulates" of
of applied welfare economics. I1 When
when
consumer benefits from consumption
consumption may be measured
measured
these assumptions are valid, the consumer
as the area beneath
beneath the ordinary demand
demand curve, so that net changes in consumer
consumer welfare
may
m a y be measured using Marshallian consumer
consumer surplus, and the area beneath
beneath the supply
curve is a measure of total costs, so that changes in the net welfare of producers may
m a y be
measured
measured using producer surplus or quasi-rent. 22
One of the key points to be made in the pages that follow is that supply conditions,
especially elasticities of factor supply but also factor cost shares and elasticities of
among factors, are primary determinants of the incidence of policies.
substitution among
Supply analysis is difficult in a range of dimensions, including the inherent dynamics,
uncertainty, and the role of expectations. Here, we abstract completely from the truly

I1 These
These postulates
postulates are
are (a)
(a) that
that the
the competitive
competitivedemand
demand price
price for
for a given
given unit
unit measures
measures the
the value
value of
of that
that unit
unit
to
to the
the demander,
demander, (b)
(b) that
that the
the competitive
competitive supply
supply price
price for
for a given
given unit
unit measures
measures the
the value
valueof that
that unit
unit to
to the
the
supplier,
supplier, and
and (c)
(c) that
that when
when evaluating
evaluatingthe
the net benefits
benefits or
or costs
costs of
of a given
given policy
pohcy action,
action, the
the costs
costs and
and benefits
benefits
should be
be added
added without
without regard
regard to
to the
the individual(s)
individual(s)to
to whom
whom they
they accrue.
accrue. Harberger
Harberger(1971)
(1971) also
also discusses
discussesthe
the
should
implications
implications of
of mUltiple
multiple market
market distortions
distortions in
in general
general equilibrium
equilibriumfor
for these
these welfare
welfare measures
measures and
and provides
provides aa
multiple-distortion
multiple-distortiondeadweight-loss
deadweight-lossmeasure.
measure.
In aa comprehensive
comprehensive review
review of
of empirical
empirical approaches
approaches to
to the
the measurement
measurement of
of welfare,
welfare, Siesnick
Slesnick (1998)
(1998)
22 In
reviewed
reviewed the
the literature
literature documenting
documenting the
the shortcomings
shortcomings of Marshallian
Marshallian consumer
consumer surplus
surplus as
as a measure
measure of
of
consumer
consumer welfare
welfare and
and social
social welfare.
weffare.

dynamic and uncertain nature of agricultural supply response and, for the most part,
consider comparative-static analysis with a given supply curve. But we do consider the
implications of an increasing elasticity of supply, with increasing length of run, for
the longer-run incidence of policy - the evolution of the incidence with the evolution
of supply response. Notably, one of the first empirical studies of agricultural policy
incidence was by Nerlove (1958) in a study titled The Dynamics
Dynamics of
o f Supply.
Supply.
A related issue concerns the degree of aggregation across markets. As we aggregate
across commodities, supply becomes less elastic, in particular because the inelasticity of
the total supply of land becomes increasingly more relevant as a constraint. For the most
part, here, we will be considering policies for individual commodities, commodities
for which it is not appropriate to regard the supply of land as absolutely fixed (even
if it were appropriate for a nation as a whole, when considering all agricultural
commodities together). Only if we are considering changes in a policy that affects all
of the commodities together is it reasonable to consider the market for an aggregate
agricultural commodity with a fixed supply of land. Even then, a multimarket model,
taking appropriate account of the differences among commodities, is likely to be more
meaningful, unless the commodities all experience the same policy effects.
Many policies affect agriculture. However, attention here will be limited to policies
that are applied directly through farm commodity markets or input markets with a view
to raising returns to producers)
producers. 3 In Section 2, we consider output subsidies and output
quotas in the context of a single-market, closed-economy model. Since international
international
trade is important in most agricultural commodity markets, in Section 3 we extend the
discussion to consider markets and policies for traded goods. We limit our coverage
of those aspects, though, since international
international trade and trade policy are the subject of
another chapter. In Section 4, we consider vertical linkages in multimarket models,
which allows us to extend the set of instruments to consider subsidies or quotas on
inputs. While we consider small multimarket models, the analysis here is restricted to
partial equilibrium
equilibrium models.
In all of these models, for each instrument, we consider the effects on prices and
quantities of output (and, where relevant, inputs) and, accordingly, on economic welfare
and its distribution among taxpayers, consumers, and producers (and, where relevant,
input suppliers). We consider both simple policies and policies involving combinations
of instruments, and we compare policies in terms of their transfer efficiency, using
conventional stylized models of policies and markets. In addition, we maintain the
assumptions that imply that changes in producer and consumer surplus are appropriate
measures of welfare change: static supply and demand, perfect knowledge, perfect
competition, and perfect and costless enforcement of policies.
In the subsequent sections we consider some extensions to the above models, including some more realistic characterizations of supply controls (Section 5), variability
and stabilization issues (Section 6), the role of imperfect enforcement and other costs

33 The
procedures could
used to evaluate
transfers to consumers
Alston et al.
The same
sameprocedures
could be used
evaluatetransfers
consumers [e.g.,
[e.g., Alston
al. (1999)].
(1999)].

of administering policies (Section 7), and some implications of the dynamics of supply response for the incidence of different policies (Section 8). Importantly, however,
throughout the chapter we retain the assumption of perfect competition. Finally, Section 9 concludes the chapter.

2. Single-market models of policy incidence in commodity markets
Discussions of the formal analysis of the welfare consequences of agricultural policy
often begin with Wallace (1962). Other influential articles in this area, published around
the same time, include Nerlove (1958), Parish (1962), Floyd (1965), Johnson (1965),
Dardis (1967), and Dardis and Learn (1967). Much of this work can be traced to the
University of Chicago.
basic model
model
2.1. The basic

Wallace (1962) compared the effects of two stylized policies in a competitive market
for a non-traded commodity: (1) a marketing quota (which he called the "Cochrane
proposal"), and (2) a target price and deficiency payments (which he called the
"Brannan plan"). These two policies are depicted in Figure 1, where D represents
demand, S represents supply, and the initial equilibrium occurs at the price, Po, and
corresponding quantity, Qo. The policies are designed to generate a given price, P1,
PI, for
producers. This is done either by fixing a quota of Q1,
Q I, or by fixing a producer target
Qz to be sold at a consumer
price at PI,
P1, allowing the corresponding production of Q2
price, P2,
Pz, and paying producers a deficiency payment of P1
PI - P2
Pz per unit. In this static
setting the latter policy is identically equivalent to paying producers a per unit subsidy
of PI
P1 - P2,
Pz, and for simplicity we refer to it below as a subsidy. Both policies result in the
P1, but the quota reduces the quantity produced
produced and consumed
same producer price of PI,
to Q I,
1, while the subsidy increases it to Q2.
Qz.
The size and distribution
distribution of the welfare effects differ between the two policies,
as shown
shown in Table 1 (as is conventional
conventional practice, for this analysis it is assumed
assumed that
quota rents accrue to producers
producers and
and are included
included in producer
producer surplus). An
An important
important
quota
distinction
distinction between
between the two policies is their effects on consumers
consumers and taxpayers.
of consumers, with
with no effect on
on
The quota
quota policy benefits producers
producers at the expense of
The
taxpayers, while the subsidy policy benefits consumers
producers, all at
consumers as well as producers,
the expense of
of taxpayers. Producer
Producer benefits are greater under
under the subsidy, since area
A+
+ B ÷+ C is greater than
than area A - (G ++ K).
K). The
The net social cost or deadweight
deadweight loss
from the quota
N S == areaB
area B ++ G ++ K,
K, where
where ANS
L'lNS is the change
change in net
quota (DWLq
(DWLq == --AL'lNS
social welfare) may be
E),
be greater or smaller than
than that for the subsidy (DWLs
(DWLs = area E),
depending
depending on the relative sizes of
of supply and demand
demand elasticities.
elasticities.
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Figure 1. Welfare effects of a quota and a subsidy.
subsidy.

Table 1
Welfare effects of a quota and a subsidy
Changes in

Marketing quota

Producer Surplus (6.PS)
(APS)
Consumer
Consumer Surplus (6.CS)
(ACS)
(ATS)
Taxpayer Surplus (6.TS)
National Surplus (6.NS
(ANS = -DWL)

AA
- (G+K)
(G + K)
-(A+B)
- ( A + B)
0
o
-(B+G+K)
- ( B + G + K)

Production subsidy

A
+ B+ C
A+B+C
F
+ G+ H + I
F+G+H+I
--(A
+ B + C + E + F + G + H + I)
-~+B+C+E+F+G+H+n
-E
-E

Note: The entries in this table refer to areas on Figure 1 associated with each policy applied to generate the
given increase in the producer price.

The relationship
relationship between
b e t w e e n the
the deadweight
d e a d w e i g h t loss
loss measures
m e a s u r e s for the two
two policies
can be
The
policies can
be
seen
by approximating
policy, using
using linear
seen by
a p p r o x i m a t i n g the
the social
social cost
cost of
o f each
each policy,
linear approximations
a p p r o x i m a t i o n s of
of
supply
supply and
and demand.
demand. These
T h e s e approximate
a p p r o x i m a t e social
social cost
cost areas
areas are given by:

22(8+ry)

1
2 2( e + 7");
1
DWL
D W L qq = -PoQOT
~PoOo'c ry
rl \ eO- /;
2
8ry

1
DWLs = -POQOT
2

22(8+ry)
8

--,

\

8ry
77 /

where
price, 8e is the
where T
r Po is the
the increase
increase in price,
the supply
supply elasticity, and
and ry
~ is the
the absolute
absolute value
v a l u e of
of
the
policy increases
the demand
d e m a n d elasticity
elasticity at the initial equilibrium.
equilibrium. The
T h e social
social cost
cost of
o f either
either policy
increases
price wedge
with
with the
the size of
o f the
the induced
i n d u c e d quantity
quantity change,
change, and
and the
the size of
o f the
the price
w e d g e associated
associated

with that change. Intuitively, the quantity response to the subsidized price increases as
supply becomes more elastic, and a more restrictive quota will be required to reach the
target price as demand becomes more elastic. Thus, the social cost of the quota increases
with increases in the demand elasticity and with reductions in the supply elasticity, while
the converse is true for the subsidy. As summarized by Wallace (1962), DWL
DWLq/>
DVVLss
q ~ DWL
when 1]~/>
~ 8,
e, and vice versa. So, if demand is more elastic than supply (as depicted in
Figure 1), the social cost of a quota is greater than that of a subsidy policy, for a given
effect on producer price.
A weakness of this analysis is that, in comparing the instruments, it may not be
appropriate to hold the producer price effect constant. More recent work, which has
its roots in articles by Nerlove (1958), Dardis (1967),
( 1967), and Josling
Jo sling (1969), has developed
a more useful basis for comparing policies. 44 Rather than comparing social costs for
a given increase in price or gross revenue, policies are compared in terms of their
efficiency of redistribution, or transfer efficiency.
2.2. Efficient redistribution
redistribution

Measures of transfer efficiency provide a means for comparing the benefits to producers
with the combined costs to consumers and taxpayers, and to society as a whole.
Several such measures have their roots in literature described above, but the idea was
popularized by Gardner (1983, 1987a, 1987b). Gardner (1983) linked various measures
of transfer efficiency to the graphical representation of agricultural policy incidence
incidence
developed by Josling (1974) and showed how the results depend on elasticities. Using
this approach, alternative policies can be compared graphically in terms of their
efficiency in meeting a particular goal.
The graphical comparison of policies is facilitated by the use of surplus transformation curves, which are typically attributed to Josling (1974). The surplus transformation
curve (STC) for a particular policy instrument typically shows the range of combinations of welfare of producers versus consumers and taxpayers that can be achieved using that instrument. 55 Several STCs, one for each policy instrument under consideration,
may be drawn in a single graph. Then, given some target level of producer benefits
or some acceptable cost to consumers and taxpayers, policies may be compared easily
in terms of one of several efficiency measures that are defined below. These graphical
representations allow us to compare policy consequences, to prescribe more efficient
understand policy choices.
policies, and to understand

4 Nerlove (1958) expressed welfare losses per net increment to producer surplus as did Dardis (1967), Dardis
and Dennisson (1969), and Dardis and Learn (1967). losling
Josfing (1969) considered two objectives
objectives - increasing
farm income and displacing
policies in terms of the marginal and average
displacing imports - and compared policies
average costs per
unit of each objective.
objective.
S5 The axes need not be defined
defined this way. Reducing the problem to two dimensions is helpful but not
necessary,
necessary, and for some problems it may be appropriate to aggregate
aggregate consumers
consumers with producers versus
taxpayers, or producers with taxpayers versus consumers.
consumers.

2.2.1. Redistribution
Redistribution using an output
output quota
The STC for a production quota indicates the combinations of producer and consumer
surplus attained when the quota quantity is varied. An example is shown in Figure 2.
When
When the quota is set at the initial equilibrium quantity, Qo
Q0 in Figure 1, the competitive
equilibrium is reached, with a distribution of surplus represented by point E in Figure 2.
Movement along the STC to the left of point E shows how much producer surplus
increases and consumer surplus decreases as the quota quantity is progressively reduced.
At point L in Figure 2, if PS 11 and CS 11 are those resulting from the quota quantity Q
Q 11
in Figure 1, then i1PS
APS and i1CS
ACS in Figure 2 correspond to the areas A - (G +
+ K) and
A+
+ B, respectively, in Figure 1.
The deadweight loss (DWL) associated with quota quantity Q1 is also shown in
Figure 2. For any value of CS, the total DWL is seen graphically as the vertical distance
from the STC to the 45°
45 ° line through point E, while for any value of PS, the total DWL
is seen as the horizontal distance from the STC to the 45°
45 ° line. Thus, the vertical or
horizontal distance from point L to the 45°
45 ° line corresponds to area (B +
+ G+
+ K), the
DWL associated with a quota quantity of Q
1. As noted above, the DWL associated with
Q1.
a quota increases as the quantity distortion increases, so the DWL is always increasing
as one moves further to the left from point E.
DWL is a useful measure for comparing policies when the objective is to increase
producer surplus by a certain amount. However, when benefits to producers vary across
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Figure
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policies, a measure of average transfer efficiency may be more appropriate (although
comparisons are meaningful only if we hold constant either producer benefits or costs to
others). One such measure is what Dardis (1967) referred to as the Relative Social Cost
(RSC) of a policy, which is defined as the change in total social welfare (i.e., the negative
of the DWL) per dollar transferred to producers (i.e., -DWLj
- D W L / A.6.PS).
P S ) . RSC is inversely
related to the average efficiency measure used by Gardner (1983), the average producer
.6.(CS +
benefit for each dollar foregone by consumers and taxpayers - i.e., .6.PSj
APS/A(CS
+ TS),
which he called "total redistribution". The primary advantage of Gardner's measure is
that it can be seen graphically as the slope of the line going through point E and the
relevant point on the STC. Because the STC is concave, Gardner's average efficiency
measure is always decreasing (in absolute value) as we move away from the competitive
equilibrium. Furthermore, because of the inverse relationship between average transfer
efficiency (ATE) and the RSC of a policy (i.e., ATE = 1Ij(RSC-l»,
/ ( R S C - 1)), the DWL per dollar
transferred to producers increases as we move along the STC to the left of point E.
A final group of efficiency measures evaluates the marginal efficiency of the transfer
to producers. The marginal efficiency of a transfer indicates how much of the next dollar taken from consumers (and taxpayers) will actually be received by producers, and
is equal to the absolute value of the slope of the STC at a given point. Similarly, the
marginal DWL
DWL of a dollar taken from consumers and taxpayers is equal to one minus
the marginal efficiency. Finally, the inverse ofthe
of the marginal efficiency can be interpreted
as the marginal cost to consumers and taxpayers of transferring another dollar to producers, and one minus this marginal cost is equal to the absolute value of the marginal
RSC of an additional dollar transferred to producers. Because the first of these marginal
efficiency measures is most clearly seen in graphs of STCs, it will be the focus of the
following discussion.
The marginal efficiency of the first dollar transferred to producers is equal to the
slope of the STC at the no-intervention equilibrium, point E, which is -1,
- 1, reflecting the
negligible DWL
DWL associated with a small restriction in quota. As the quota is reduced,
each incremental dollar of welfare loss to consumers yields a smaller incremental
producer surplus gain: the marginal gain in producer surplus diminishes and the STC
flattens. This continues until the point is reached where the slope of the STC is zero (its
tangent is horizontal), which occurs when the quota quantity equals the output quantity
for a monopolist (point M in Figure 2). Further
Further reductions in quota will reduce both
producer and consumer surplus.
The relationship between marginal transfer efficiency and average efficiency is also
of interest. Consider point L, where the tangent line is flatter than the line connecting
points Land
L and E. This relationship indicates that average efficiency is greater than marginal efficiency, and that the decreasing marginal efficiency of additional transfers is
pulling down the average efficiency. Because the STC is concave, as one moves away
from the competitive equilibrium, both marginal and average efficiencies fall with increases in transfers to producers.

2.2.2. Redistribution using a subsidy
The STC for a subsidy is derived as above, by evaluating the combinations of producer,
consumer, and taxpayer welfare associated with different settings of the subsidy.
Unlike the quota policy, however, taxpayers are affected by the implementation of
a subsidy. In order to reduce the STC to two dimensions, consumers and taxpayers
are typically treated as one group, and consumer and taxpayer surplus are added
together. Movement to the left along the STC in this case corresponds to an increase
in the per unit subsidy. The shape of the STC for a subsidy differs slightly from
that for a quota. While both STCs are concave, the slope of the STC for the subsidy
+ TS, since producers can always
is always negative over the relevant range of CS +
be made better off at the expense of consumers and taxpayers - producer welfare
always increases as the subsidy is increased. This is the primary difference between the
subsidy and quota, since producer welfare cannot be increased once a quota has reached
the monopolist's quantity. Otherwise, the interpretation and graphical representations
of the various efficiency measures are the same for the STCs of the two policy
instruments.
2.2.3. Comparing quotas and subsidies
In comparing the STCs for the two policies, the same types of relationships can be
seen as were discussed above in the comparison of the two policies while holding
the price effects equal. Here, however, we compare the policies for a given benefit to
of the STC for a subsidy relative to that of the STC for a quota
producers. The position of
is determined by the elasticities of supply and demand. When
When demand is more elastic
undistorted equilibrium
equilibrium (or when the two elasticities are equal), the
than supply at the undistorted
STC for the subsidy lies entirely above that for the quota. In this case, for any PS, the
subsidy will have a smaller DWL, and will be a more efficient means for transferring
income to producers, on both an average and a marginal basis.
interesting case in terms of policy performance. Here, supply
Figure 3 shows a more interesting
is more elastic than demand at the competitive equilibrium.
equilibrium. For a given relatively small
transfer to producers,
of a
producers, the DWL
DWL associated with
with a subsidy policy is larger than
than that of
quota, and
and both
both marginal and
and average efficiency measures favor the quota. However,
when the transfer to producers
when
producers is increased,
increased, the marginal efficiency of
of the subsidy
that of
of the quota. At
At some higher
higher PS, the two STCs intersect,
intersect, and
and
eventually exceeds that
equal. For
For transfers beyond
beyond that
that PS amount, the subsidy will
the average efficiencies are equal.
of average and marginal efficiency.
DWL and
and more favorable measures of
have a smaller DWL
can be
be attained
attained only
Furthermore, producer
producer surplus
surplus in excess of
of the
the monopolist's PS can
Furthermore,
of a subsidy. The
The main
main point,
point, here,
here, is that
that the relative efficiency of
of the
the two
by use of
policies will
of the
the transfer as well
well as the
the supply and
and demand
demand
will depend
depend on the
the size of
elasticities.
elasticities.
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STCSubsidy

STCQuota

45°
45 ° Line

o L...---------------------~C~S:-+~TS
CS+TS
Figure 3. Surplus transformation curves: quota versus subsidy.

2.3. Multiple instruments
Alston and Hurd (1990) extended Gardner's (1983) analysis to show what happens
when the policies are not mutually exclusive and may be combined efficiently.
efficiently. If a
quota set equal to the competitive quantity were combined with a subsidy, transfers
from taxpayers to producers could be made without any distortions in production or
consumption because the quota would prevent supply response to the subsidy. Thus, the
efficient STC for this problem is the 45°
45 ° line in Figure 3 since, by combining the two
instruments, the equivalent of a lump-sum transfer is achieved.
The idea that combining instruments can increase transfer efficiency
efficiency has been
formalized and extended in several recent articles, going beyond two interest groups and
two policies. One issue is the number of policy instruments required to achieve a Paretoefficient outcome, given a particular number of interest groups. Bullock (1994, 1995)
and empirical
has analyzed this issue. Bullock and Salhofer (1998a) provided theoretical
theoreticaland
results on measuring the costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments, and
Bullock and Salhofer (1998b) showed that under the usual assumptions, in general, the
addition of another instrument cannot reduce transfer efficiency.
efficiency. A number of recent
studies have measured the transfer efficiency
efficiency of different simple and combined policies,
including Kola (1993), Salhofer (1996, 1997), and Alston and Gray (1998). In earlier
work, Just (1984), Innes and Rausser (1989), and Gisser (1993) considered the welfare

implications of combined policies, but did not measure transfer efficiency. Bullock,
Salhofer and Kola (1999) present a synthesis and review of these and related studies.
studies.
2.4. The marginal social opportunity
opportunity cost offunds
of funds

The analysis above rests on the conventional assumption that a dollar of government
spending involves a loss of taxpayer surplus of one dollar. In developing the STC for
a subsidy, Gardner (1983) considered the effects when the social opportunity cost of
one dollar of government spending is greater than one dollar, owing to the distortions
involved in general taxation measures. Thus the marginal taxpayer cost of a subsidy
expenditure can be represented as 1 +
+ 8
3 times that amount, where 8
3 is the marginal
excess burden or deadweight loss involved in generating the revenue to finance the
subsidy. This excess burden includes the deadweight losses from distortions in the
markets from which the tax revenue is raised (primarily, the labor market) along with
taxpayer costs of compliance, and costs to the treasury, including revenue collection
costs and other costs of administration and enforcement of the tax policy.
Most studies of the deadweight costs of general taxation refer only to the distortions
in the labor market associated with income taxes. One issue in the literature has been
the appropriate value for the relevant labor supply elasticity,
elasticity, which may depend on
assumptions about what is to be done with the tax revenue. The response of the quantity
of labor supplied to the imposition of a tax can be partitioned into substitution and
income effects which work in opposite directions so that the uncompensated labor
supply curve, including both effects, is less elastic than the compensated supply curve,
including only the substitution effect. If all tax revenues were effectively returned to
taxpayers - through either a lump-sum payment or the provision of public good - then
the income effect would be eliminated. When the income effect is eliminated, the taxinduced distortion in quantity and the deadweight costs of taxation are larger.
An extensive literature documents measures of the deadweight losses from income
taxation and discusses the interpretation of the estimates. Relatively recently, Fullerton
(1991) reconciled a wide range of previous estimates of the marginal social cost of
public funds in the United States in terms of their treatment of the income effect.
He suggested values for the marginal cost of public funds ranging from $1.07, when
the income effect is included, to $1.25 when the income effect has been eliminated.
Campbell and Bond (1997) reported corresponding estimates for Australia of $1.19
and $1.24;6
$1.24; 6 similar estimates were obtained by Diewert and Lawrence (1995) for New
Zealand. A value for 8~ in the range of 10 to 25 percent seems plausible. In the context
of benefit-cost analysis of the provision of public goods, Campbell and Bond (1997)
and Campbell (1997) argue for using the larger value. They note that measures of the
benefits from projects funded with taxes generally do not include income effects, and
so neither should the measures of the costs.
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2.4.1. Implications
Implications of
o f 8>
3> 0
To show the effects of 86 > 0, Figure 4 replicates the curves in Figure 3. If a dollar of
+8
3 dollars, the STC for a subsidy alone
subsidy payments reduces taxpayer surplus by 1 +
is shifted down from b to b '~,, while the STC for a quota is unaffected. This increases the
likelihood that an all-or-nothing choice between production controls and subsidies will
favor production controls. The reasoning is straightforward. For very small transfers, the
distortion associated with a quota is infinitesimal and the marginal transfer efficiency of
a quota is almost one. However, a one dollar lump-sum payment now costs the economy
1+
÷ 8
3 dollars, owing to the excess burden of taxation. This deadweight cost of taxation,
in addition to the deadweight loss in the commodity market caused by the subsidy,
- 1/(1
+ 8),
3), even for
(1 +
means that the slope of the STC for the subsidy must be less than -1/
very small transfers.
Consider, again, a subsidy combined with a quota fixed at the competitive quantity.
The surplus transformation curve for this policy is no longer the line, c, with slope
-1,
- 1 , but, rather, the line, d, with slope -1/
- 1 / ( (l
1 +
+ 8).
6). This line, d, is also the STC for a
lump-sum transfer, as described above. However, when 83 > 0, the policy of combining
a quota of Qo
Q0 and a subsidy is no longer efficient. As shown by Alston and Hurd
(1990), a superior option would be to combine a subsidy with a production quota set
at the quantity corresponding to point F,
F, where the slope of the STC for production
-1/(1 +
+ 8),
3), and the marginal deadweight cost from further reductions
controls equals -1/(1
PS

d
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3.1. Market power in trade
Large-country trading nations, by definition, can influence the world market price by
changing their quantities traded. Hence, as nations they have market power in the
international market and can improve net domestic welfare by exploiting their monopoly
power in export markets or their monopsony power in import markets. In order to obtain
the greatest possible national benefits from production and consumption, a large-country
importer might tax imports with an "optimal tariff" while a large-country expOlier
exporter might
charge an "optimal export tax".
To see how this works, consider Figure 5 in which panel a represents the domestic
market (with domestic supply, S, and domestic demand, D) and panel b represents the
export market (with supply of exports, ES, and demand for exports, ED). The export
supply curve is given by the horizontal difference between domestic demand and supply
-- i.e., at any price, the quantity on ES is equal to the quantity on S minus the quantity
on D (similarly, ED is derived, implicitly, as the difference between demand and supply
in the rest of the world). With free trade, the equilibrium is given by the intersection
of ED and ES, resulting in a price of P0,
Po, so that the quantity produced domestically is
Qo,
Eo, equal
Q0, the quantity consumed domestically is Co, and the quantity exported is E0,
to Qo
Q0 - Co. From the home country's point of view, welfare is maximized when the
marginal revenue from sales on the export market (MR in panel b of Figure 5) is equal
to the marginal (opportunity) cost of exports, measured by ES. This outcome is achieved
when the quantity exported is equal to E
El,1, which could be achieved by imposing either
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Figure 5. Optimal export tax for a large country.
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an export quota equal to EI
E1 or an export tax equal to t per unit (and at the optimum, t
would be equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of export demand). 88
With the export tax, the equilibrium price paid by foreigners increases to PI
P1 +
+ t,
but the domestic price falls to PI,
I,
P1, so that the quantity produced domestically is Q
Q1,
C1,
the quantity consumed domestically is C
I, and the quantity exported is E~,
E I, equal to
Q
I. The welfare effects can be seen in panel a. Domestic consumer surplus
QII - C
C1.
+ B, domestic producer surplus falls by area A +
+ B+
+ C+
+ E+
+ F, but
increases by area A +
taxpayers gain revenue of tEl
tEl =
= area G +
+ E. Thus, the net effect on domestic welfare
is a gain equal to area G - (C +
+ F) (equal to area H +
+ I - J in panel b), and this
amount is positive and maximized when t is set "optimally". An export quota set at
E
E1I would have the same effects on producers, consumers, and domestic welfare; the
+ E would be quota rent (going to those given the
only difference would be that area G +
licenses to export) rather than tax revenue.
Corresponding results apply for an importable good, for which there is an optimal
tariff,
tariff, which equates the marginal cost of imports and the domestic consumer and
producer prices (with the tariff rate equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of supply
of imports), and an equivalent optimal import quota. Terms of trade effects also arise
through the operation of any other instruments that affect traded quantities in a largecountry trader,
trader, including quotas and subsidies applied to total production.
3.2. Output quotas for traded goods

An output quota alone cannot be a useful policy for transferring income to producers in a
small open economy. When we see an output quota applied by an importing or exporting
country that is a price taker in the world market, it is always in conjunction with some
other trade-restricting policy. In these cases, trade restrictions prevent international
arbitrage from undermining the quota's intended effects: to raise producer returns by
restricting supply and thereby raising domestic consumer prices. For instance, milk
quotas are generally accompanied by barriers against imports and, when these quotas
apply at a sub-national level, barriers to interprovincial or interstate trade.
In a large-country case, where the country can influence the world price, a production
quota still does not make much sense for an importer that aims to assist producers.
A restriction of domestic output may drive up the domestic and world price for the
commodity, but it would be a very inefficient policy, since producers in the rest of the
world would benefit without having to restrict their production. In this case, producers
could be protected instead by an import quota or a tariff,
tariff, possibly with an increase rather
than a decrease in domestic welfare, since the policy would work to the disadvantage
of the rest of the world. Import barriers have been extensively applied as part of the
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protective umbrella for domestic agricultural producers in most countries that protect
agriculture, whether they have market power in trade or not.
For a large-country exporter, an output quota offers similar benefits to an export quota
(or export tax), but is less efficient since the output quota distorts domestic consumption.
A case in point is the farm program for U.S. tobacco, which has been analyzed in these
terms by Johnson (1965), Johnson and Norton (1983), Johnson (1984), Sumner and
Alston (1984), and Alston and Sumner (1988). These authors all concluded
concluded that the
U.S. tobacco quota had generated net benefits to the U.S. economy - the U.S. benefits
from monopolistic exploitation of the markets in the rest of the world outweighed
outweighed the
losses from distortions in U.S. production and consumption. While not as efficient as an
export tax, which is ruled out by the U.S. Constitution, the output quota had achieved
many of the same benefits. Clearly, in such setting, a quota is a more efficient means of
transferring income to producers than any form of output or export subsidy, which must
entail deadweight
deadweight losses - especially when 8>
~ > O.
0.

3.3. Comparing subsidies on output versus exports
Following Gardner (1983), Alston and Hurd (1990) compared a range of instruments
in terms of their costs of achieving a given benefit to producers in the case of a smallcountry importer or exporter. The results parallel those for the closed economy case.
They showed that the introduction
introduction of 8
3 > 0 changes the comparison between policies
that involve different amounts of government spending as well as between those that
involve spending and those that do not, overturning some conventional wisdom that is
based on an implicit assumption that 8
6=
= O.
0.
A conventional view is that trade-distorting policies cannot be preferred to a
production subsidy as a means of supporting domestic producer income. However,
Alston and Hurd (1990) showed that, in the case of a small-country importer, a tariff
combined with a quota and an output subsidy might be more efficient than an output
subsidy alone, depending on the relative slopes of supply and demand. Moreover, the
rankings of policies may change completely when 8
3 > O.
0. Certainly some tax on trade
will be superior to free trade when 8
~ is positive, even in this small-country case. Indeed,
an import tariff could yield net social benefits when a dollar of tariff revenue is worth
1+
÷ 8
3 dollars of taxpayer surplus.
It is not possible to rank all policies unambiguously from theory alone. As in the
case of a closed economy, the ranking of policies in an open economy depends on the
size of the transfer, elasticities of supply and demand, the marginal value of government
revenue, as well as the share of production that is traded. Alston, Carter and Smith
(1993) compared subsidies on output and exports for both large- and small-country
cases. As they showed, the comparison of an export subsidy and an output subsidy
for a given producer benefit depends on the difference between the cost of distortions
in domestic consumption under
under the export subsidy and the deadweight
deadweight losses from
additional taxation to fund the additional outlays for the output subsidy. The social cost
of consumption distortions is infinitesimal for small transfers, but grows geometrically

with rising subsidies. A result that is surprising to some is that, for large values of 8 or
relatively small transfers, an export subsidy could be more efficient than a subsidy on
all output. 99 As well as changing the efficiency ranking of policy instruments, different
values of 8
6 change the measure of the taxpayer costs and the net social costs.
3.4. Price discrimination and
pooling schemes
and pooling

A common policy has been to establish statutory authorities (such as marketing boards
or state trading enterprises) that are empowered to price discriminate among markets.
Some discriminate between fresh and processing uses of a commodity (e.g., various
milk marketing authorities) and others between different geopolitical markets (e.g.,
domestic versus export markets). Among the best-known examples are the Australian
and Canadian
Canadian wheat boards. These types of policies have been studied extensively in
general terms [e.g., Alston and Freebaim
Freebairn (1988)] as well as in particular instances
[e.g., Parish (1963), Ippolito and Masson (1978), Longworth and Knopke (1982), Sieper
(1982)]. A key feature of such schemes is that they are self-financing - i.e., no taxpayer
expenditure is required. Rather, different segments of the total market are separated and
charged different discriminatory prices, the resulting revenue is pooled, and producers
receive and respond to a unit price equal to the average revenue thus obtained.
The simplest case, with a perfectly elastic export demand and a downward-sloping
domestic demand, is shown in Figure 6. In this case, the domestic price is set above the
export price, since domestic demand is less elastic than export demand, and the producer
(Pp)
price (P
p ) is equal to a share-weighted average of the domestic price (Pd) and the export
price (P
(Pe).
e ). The pooled price line is defined such that the pooled revenue for any quantity
to producers exactly exhausts the revenue earned from the domestic and export markets.
At the equilibrium, this means that total revenue (areaB
(area B +
+ C+
+ E +
÷ F +
+ G) equals the
revenue from the domestic market (area A +
÷ B+
+ F)
F) plus revenue from the export market
(area G). Hence, area A = areaC
area C +
+ E.
Alston and Freebaim
Freebairn (1988) extended the analysis to a large-country exporter. Alston,
Carter and Smith (1993), following Sieper (1982) and others, argued that such a policy
of regulated pricing and revenue pooling could be regarded as the equivalent of either
(a) an output subsidy of P
Ppp -- P
Pee per unit financed by a domestic consumption tax of
Pe per unit, or (b) an export subsidy of Pp
Pp -- Pe
Pe per unit financed by a domestic
Pd --- Pe
Pp per unit. In this sense, price-discriminatory, revenueconsumption tax of Pd --- Pp
pooling schemes can be considered as export subsidy programs financed by a tax on
a particular group (consumers of the subsidized commodity), rather than on society as a
whole. [Alston, Carter and Smith (1995) and Gardner (1995) elaborate on whether this
perspective is reasonable.]
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Figure 6. Price discrimination and revenue pooling.

The conclusions drawn from the simplest case - price discrimination and revenue
pooling in a small country - apply also to a more general setting with multiple separate
markets and market power in trade. For example, Alston and Gray (1998) compared an
export subsidy against price discrimination and revenue pooling by a state trader having
Canadian Wheat
Wheat Board, CWB) as alternative
sole export powers (exemplified by the Canadian
ways of achieving a given benefit to producers. They showed that the effective export
under the policy of a state trader discriminating against
subsidy per unit must be greater under
would be the same under
under both policies but the
the domestic market (since production
production would
domestic price would
would be lower and domestic consumption
consumption greater under
under the export
under
subsidy). They also found that transfer efficiency was likely to have been greater under
the actual CWB policies in 1994
1994 than if
if an equivalent export subsidy had been
been used.

4. Multimarket
Multimarket models
models

The conventional
conventional supply and demand
demand model, while powerful, has some limitations. In
The
participants in the commodity market are characterized
characterized as either producers
producers
particular, participants
when we disaggregate
or consumers, and their welfare is aggregated accordingly. Even when
horizontally, between
between domestic and
and foreign producers
producers and consumers, we have still
aggregated vertically across various suppliers of
of factors of
of production
production and
and final
consumers.
Our
Our choice of
of which
which market to analyze implicitly defines how welfare measures
are aggregated. For
For instance,
instance, if
if we study policy incidence
incidence in a retail market, benefits

accruing to middlemen are combined with those accruing to all other input suppliers in
"producer" surplus; if we study incidence
incidence in the market for the farm product, however,
benefits to middlemen are part of "consumer surplus". Vertical disaggregation of
markets and the resulting welfare measures is important if we are to accurately describe,
prescribe, and explain policy choices when the goal of policy is to transfer benefits to
specific resource owners or interest groups (such as landowners or agribusiness firms).
To disaggregate these measures of policy incidence
incidence into more useful subaggregates
requires a more elaborate model of supply and demand.
At one extreme, we can envision a totally disaggregated general equilibrium
equilibrium model,
in which consumption expenditures are endogenous and depend on factor payments
as well as endowment
endowment incomes. At the other extreme, we have the single commodity
market model, as discussed above. In between lie many intermediate cases with different
degrees of elaboration of the vertical structure and factor markets, and the horizontal
structure in terms of different commodities and spatial aggregates. Modeling several
linked markets allows us to take account of cross-market effects, which may be
important for accurately measuring the incidence
incidence in the market for the commodity
in question, as well as for studying the spillover effects into the related commodity
markets. 10
In what follows we consider small, essentially partial equilibrium, multimarket
settings, to see the implications of the vertical structure for incidence among factors.
Similar models can also be used to consider the incidence of policy in a multi-output
setting - where, when commodities interact in either production or consumption,
policies applied in the market for one commodity can have implications for producers
and consumers of related commodities. This type of multimarket structure was modeled
by Buse (1958) and more recently by Piggott (1992) in terms of the equilibrium
equilibrium prices
and quantities. Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1982), Thurman (1991,1993),
(1991, 1993), Bullock (1993),
and Brannlund
Br~innlund and Kristrom
Kristr6m (1996) discuss welfare measures and their interpretations
in this type of setting. An early study in this vein was by Hushak (1971).
4.1.
4.1. Aggregation of goods and welfare

Welfare aggregations for vertically and horizontally linked markets are summarized
graphically in Figure 7. Here, land, labor, and other (purchased) farm inputs are used
to produce a farm product, and the farm product is used with other (marketing) inputs
to produce a retail product. Each of these farming and marketing inputs earns a quasirent or producer surplus that can be measured from its supply function, and consumer
surplus can be measured from the retail demand function. The interpretation of the
area of producer surplus (and, indeed, the associated consumer surplus) in terms of the
10
10 Such intercommodity
intercommodity interactions
interactions are involved
involved in sector-wide (but nevertheless
nevertheless partial equilibrium)
equilibrium)
models of the agricultural
agricultural sector,
sector, such as the USDA's SWOPSIM model, as well as in general equilibrium
models [such as Higgs (1986)], and are reflected in the results when those models are used to measure the
welfare effects of policy.
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Figure 7. Distribution of welfare in a multimarket model.

underlying surpluses accruing to factors of production and consumers depends on which
market is being studied.
The welfare measures defined in each market are related in precise and interesting
ways, as proven by Just and Hueth (1979). Provided that all inputs are necessary, and

that a positive shutdown price exists for output, the total surplus (the sum of consumer
+ B+
÷ C+
+ D +
+ E in every market. This
and producer surplus) is equal to area A +
means that we can measure the total economic surplus in any of the markets and get
the correct answer. However, the interpretations differ among the markets. In the retail
market, the consumer surplus accrues to purchasers of the final product and the producer
surplus includes the surpluses accruing to all the inputs. Area D accrues to suppliers of
marketing inputs, and area A +
÷ B+
+ C, the sum of the surpluses across inputs used to
produce the farm product (area A to landowners, area B to farm labor, and area C to
suppliers of purchased farming inputs), accrues to the farm product supplier.
The supply of the farm product at wholesale is derived from the underlying supply
functions for inputs used in farming and the farming technology. The demands for
the farm product and marketing inputs are derived demands, each depending on retail
demand, the processing technology, and the supply of the other. Accordingly, consumer
surplus in the farm product market includes retail consumer surplus and the producer
surplus accruing to marketing input suppliers, while consumer surplus in the market for
marketing inputs includes retail consumer surplus and farm product producer surplus.
The demands for all of the inputs used in farming are derived demands, each depending
on the demand for the farm product (which is itself a derived demand) and the supplies
of the other inputs used in farming. Consumer surplus in each of the farm input markets
includes the consumer surplus in the market for the farm product and the quasi-rents
inputs.I111
accruing to the other farm inputs.
Similar relationships among the surplus measures can be seen in all vertically and
horizontally linked markets, so long as the issue is not confounded by price feedback
effects (i.e., so long as any endogenous prices of one input are not arguments of supply
for another input). In any given market, "consumer" surplus includes the consumer
surplus of the market directly above it in the production process (i.e., the market for
which it is an input) as well as the quasi-rent accruing to suppliers of other inputs used
at the same stage of production. The area of producer surplus in any market includes
the quasi-rent accruing to suppliers of all inputs used to produce the product supplied
to that market (e.g., farm product and marketing inputs for retail; land, labor, and other
inputs for farm product).
A policy that is introduced in the market for any of the factors, or the output, affects
the factor suppliers by inducing a shift in the demand for their factor. Hence, for
example, whether suppliers of land to the industry in question benefit from a subsidy
on purchased inputs (such as, say, a fertilizer subsidy) depends on whether the derived

11
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settings, general-equilibrium type feedback of price effects into supply and demand equations
means that one cannot disentangle
disentangle the total surplus in such a fashion [for instance,
instance, see Thurman (1991, 1993)].
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significance.
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and demand relationships show how the elasticities of the three underlying functions,
and the factor shares, determine the elasticities of output supply and derived demand.
Increasing the elasticity of supply of either input increases the elasticity of supply of
output and the elasticity of demand for the other input, and increasing the elasticity of
demand for output increases the elasticities of demand for both inputs.
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Equilibrium in the retail market is given by the intersection of DR and SSR,
R, with a
quantity of QR o0 and a price of PRo. Corresponding to this are equilibria in the other
markets with quantities and prices of marketing inputs, QM
QM o0 and PMo, and of the

Table 2
distribution in a model with two factors used in fixed proportions
proportions
Surplus distribution
Market
Market

Retail
Marketing input
Marketing
Farm product

Producer surplus
(PS)

Consumer surplus
(CS)

Total (net) surplus
(NS)

B
=D+ F
B=D+F
D
F

A

C = A+ F
C=A+F
E
= A+ D
E=A+D

A
+ B= A + D+ F
A+B=A+D+F
C+ D = A+ D + F
C+D=A+D+F
E
+ F = A+ D+ F
E+F=A+D+F

Note: The entries
entries in this table refer to areas in Figure 9.

farm product,
product, QFa
PFa. As above, our measures
QF o and PFo.
measures of producer, consumer, and total
economic surplus
surplus (PS, CS, and NS) depend
depend on which market
market we look at. Table 2 lists
the surplus
surplus measures
measures for each market, and shows how they relate to one another, in
accordance with the above discussion of vertical markets.
markets.
The two-factor, fixed-proportions model can be used to consider
consider the incidence of
policies applied
applied in the different markets; for instance,
instance, a subsidy or quota in the farm or
retail markets. It can easily be seen in the model in Figure
Figure 9 that the incidence does not
depend
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input when
when we
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retail demand,
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either input
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1). Similarly, a per
either input would have the exact
same price, quantity, and welfare effects as would result if the same per unit subsidy
were applied
applied to the output market. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, if we choose to study incidence in only
one market, we must choose that market
market with a view to isolating the welfare effects
of particular
particular interest.
interest. The equivalence
equivalence of the effects of a policy (quota or subsidy),
regardless
regardless of whether
whether it applies to an input
input or output, is a direct consequence of the
of
fixed
factor
proportions.
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assumption
proportions. In the next section we relax this assumption,
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and see that the incidence of a policy depends on where it is implemented.
implemented.
4.3. Two factors with variable factor proportions
proportions

Variable factor proportions
proportions in production
production is more realistic
realistic and adds some interesting
interesting
dimensions
dimensions to the analysis. In this section, we use a market
market displacement
displacement model to consider policy incidence in an output market
market and two input markets.
markets. We can define the output as either
put
either a farm product or a retail product. In the first case, the relevant inputs would
be land and other farming inputs, whereas,
whereas, in the second case, inputs would include
include the
farm product and marketing
marketing inputs. If we were interested
interested in the effects of
of a policy on
landowners,
landowners, we must choose the first structure. Similarly, if we were interested
interested in the
effects of a policy on middlemen
middlemen (e.g., processors),
processors), we would choose the latter
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structure.
Two-factor, one-output models of agricultural
agricultural commodity markets
markets have been
been of
two types. Some
Some have assumed
assumed a relatively simple
simple (and restrictive)
restrictive) explicit
explicit functional

form for the production function, such as the Cobb-Douglas or constant-elasticity-ofsubstitution
substitution (CES) form, or the Leontief fixed-proportions form shown above). Gisser
(1993) provides a recent example using a CES model. Others have taken a local
linear approximation to a general function, and modeled displacements from an initial
equilibrium. Floyd (1965) exemplifies this approach, although he used explicit constant
elasticity models for factor supply and final demand rather than leaving those functions
in general form. Muth
Muth (1964) provides a more complete set of solutions for essentially
modelthe same model
- without imposing any specific functional forms. This approximation
approach is in some senses more general than using explicit functional forms (since it
admits more general forms of production technology). It is also usually easier, especially
when we extend the analysis to allow for more than two factors or more than one output
(although
(although cases may be found where specific functional forms are easier to solve or
have other advantages in more accurately representing particular policies).

4.3.1.
4.3.1. Equations of
of the model
In all of these two-factor models, the basic structure includes a final demand, two factor
supply equations, a production function (or a cost function) to represent the technology
production, X
for production of a homogeneous product, Q, using two factors of production,
X1I and
X2,
14 Thus, we can model the
Xz, and equations imposing competitive market clearing. 14
market equilibrium
equilibrium of a competitive industry in terms of the following six equations:
Q = D(P, A)
Q=D(P,A)

(la)
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c(W1, Wz)Q
W2)Q

(1b)
(lb)

Xl
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B2)
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The first equation expresses quantity of the product demanded, Q, as a function of
its price, P,
P, and an exogenous demand shifter, A. The second equation shows the
industry total cost function, which is assumed to be characterized by constant returns
to scale. Thus, unit costs, C(WI,
Q,, depend on the two factor prices, and,
c(Wl, Wz)
W2) = C / Q
under competition, factor payments exhaust the total product [i.e., P =
= C(WI,
c(Wl, Wz)].
W2)].
The third and fourth equations are derived by the application of Shephard's lemma to
the cost function, and are Hicksian (output constant) demands for the two factors of
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model, Muth
Muth (1964),
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(1995)].

production so that Ci
production
ci = ac(o)/aWi.
Oc(.)/OWi. The
The fifth equation
equation expresses the quantity of
of Xl
X1
supplied as a function of
of its own
own price and an exogenous
exogenous supply shifter, BI;
B1; the sixth
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equation is the supply of
o f X2. The
The endogenous
endogenous variables are the prices and quantities
quantifies of
the output
P,, WI,
output and inputs (i.e., P
W1, W2, Q, Xl,
x 1 , X2), and the exogenous
exogenous shifters are A,
5
B1, and B
B2.
BI,
2 ~5
Totally differentiating equations
equations (la-f)
( l a - f ) and expressing the results in relative change
change
terms (i.e., dX/
d X / XX = dlnX)
d l n X ) yields equations
equations in terms of
of relative changes
changes and elastici16
ties: 16
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In these equations, a,
~x, ,81,
fi~, and,82
and/32 express the effects of
of shift variables on demand
demand and
supply as general shifts in the quantity direction, in relative change
change terms. As before, 1]
rl
is the absolute value of
of the own-price elasticity of
of output
output demand,
demand, 8i
ei is the elasticity of
of
supply of
of factor i, ki is the cost share of
of factor i, and C5
cr is the elasticity of
of substitution
between the two factors. 17
between
17 This system could be solved either by repeated substitution or
by using matrix algebra methods. 18
18 The
The solution consists oflinear
of linear equations
equations expressing
relative changes
changes in endogenous
endogenous prices and quantities as functions of
of the parameters and
exogenous shifters.
the exogenous
We can use this general model to represent specific price policies that operate through
through
either input or output
output markets. 19
19 The
The shift variables take particular forms to represent
the price and quantity effects of
of a subsidy on an output
output or an input; they take different
values, combined
combined with extreme elasticity assumptions, to represent a quota
quota on an output
output
or an input. For simplicity we will drop one
one of
of the input supply shifters by setting
,82
/32 = O.
0. The
The results are summarized
summarized in Table 3 and explained below.

15
I5 Muth (1964)
(1964) also induded
included shifters
shifters to represent
represent neutral
neutral and biased technical
technical changes,
changes, but these are omitted
omitted
since
since technical
technical change
change is not the focus
focus of this analysis.
analysis.
16
16 This
This derivation
derivation uses the fact
fact that the Hicksian
Hicksian factor
factor demand
demand elasticities
elasticities can be represented
represented in terms
terms of the
elasticity of substitution
substitutionand the factor
factor shares
shares as follows:
follows: rllH1
-k2o- , ~]H
k2a, 1JfJ
tlH = kW,
kl a, 1J!A
172H2= -kW.
-klCr.
elasticity
1J~ = -kza,
1J~ = kza,
17
17 The elasticity
elasticity of substitution
substitution is defined
defined mathematically
mathematically for the case of constant
constant returns
returns to scale
scale as
a
I CJ Cz2 where CJ
Z is the second
o- =
= al2
o-12 =
= aZI
o'21 =
= CJZc
CI2C/ClC
c12
second cross-pattial
cross-partial derivative
derivativeof the cost function,
function, C(WI,
c(W1, WZ),
W2),
c 1 and Cz
c2 are its first
first derivatives.
derivatives.For perfect substitutes,
substitutes,ao- = 00,
ec, while
while for fixed
fixedfactor
factor proportions,
0.
and Cl
proportions, a = O.
18
Norton and Pardey
18 See Alston,
Alston, Norton
Pardey (1995,
(1995, pp. 258-260) for details.
details.
19
19 Gardner
Gardner (1975)
(1975) used an essentially
essentially identical
identical model
model to analyze
analyze marketing
marketing margins,
margins, and Gardner
Gardner (1987b)
(1987b)
policies.
used related
related methods
methods to analyze
analyze various
various agricultural
agricultural policies.

Table 3
effects of subsidies or quotas on output or an input in a two-factor model
Price and quantity effects
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4.3.2.
4.3.2. Output
Output subsidy
An output subsidy at a rate 100TQ
100tQ percent can be represented as an upwards shift of
= 0.1
0. ]_ gives the effects of a 10 percent output subsidy. In the
demand. Thus, setting T"gQ
Q =
model, the demand shifter, ex,
c~, operates in the quantity direction, so we set ex
~ = l1TQ
tlZ'Q
to represent an output subsidy of TrQ.
Q. The relative changes in quantities and prices as
a result of an output subsidy are given in the first column of Table 3. The subsidy
results in an increase in both the quantity and producer price of output, while the
change in consumer price is a decrease: dIn
P - TTQ.
Q. At the same time, with the increase
dln P
in production, the demands for both factors of production have increased, reflected in
increases in both the quantity and price of each factor.
Given the price and quantity changes in Table 3, we can estimate the changes in
consumer and producer welfare in any of the three markets, provided that both inputs
are necessary and that a positive shut-down price exists in the output market. For
simplicity, we can approximate the changes in consumer (or producer) surplus using the
percentage change in the relevant price, multiplied by the initial value of consumption
(or production). These approximations measure the rectangle of surplus (given by the
price change on the initial quantity) but leave out the triangle associated with the policyinduced
induced change in quantity. For small changes in prices, the rectangle is very large
relative to the triangle, and the approximation error is small.
The benefits to consumers are approximately equal to the relative change in the
consumer price multiplied by the value of initial consumptionconsumption- i.e., !lCS
ACS ~
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Q/~)PQ =
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Q(PQ/~7). Similarly, the benefits to producers can be
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~ (din P)
£) .20
APS ,~
P ) PPQQ = dIn
dln Q ((P
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2° This amount is equal to the
sum of the increases in producer surplus for the two factor suppliers. The benefit from
an output subsidy to suppliers of input i is approximately equal to the relative change in
supplier price mUltiplied
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Q/ei ). In other words, benefits to consumers, producers,
and input suppliers are approximately proportional to the increases in their respective
quantities consumed and supplied.
The benefits to suppliers of input 1 relative to suppliers of input 2, APS1/APS2,
~PSI / ~PS2, can
k2(0g2)/k2
(o" +
+ £1).
81). Clearly, a greater share of the benefits goes
be approximated as kl
k l ((0a +
+ £2)/
to a factor as it becomes more important (accounting for a larger share of costs) or less
elastically supplied. Let input 1 be land and consider the extreme case where £1
el = 0
(i.e., the supply of land is fixed), and consider the benefits to landowners relative to
(or +
+ £2)
e2)/k2cr.
other input suppliers: kl (0/ k20-. If all the benefits of an output subsidy went to
landowners, as is often claimed, this ratio would be 00.
oo. However, this can occur only in
one of two extreme cases: either the price of input 2 is fixed and there is no producer
surplus for its suppliers (£2
(e2 =
= 00),
~ ) , or factor proportions are fixed (0(a =
= 0).
The conditions
conditions under which all of the benefits from an output subsidy accrue
to landowners are extreme, but may be appropriate at some levels of aggregation.
However, it is often not adequately recognized that both factor supply conditions and
policies differ importantly between agriculture in aggregate and particular agricultural
industries.
industries. For instance, in his analysis of policies for individual commodities, Gisser
(1993) assumed a fixed supply of land for each individual crop while all other inputs
were perfectly elastically supplied. These assumptions are clearly inappropriate for
individual commodities, and guarantee that all of the benefits would go to landowners.
Such assumptions are more reasonable for agriculture as a whole. For instance, Rosine
and HeImberger
Helmberger (1974) assumed a fixed supply of land and a perfectly elastic supply
of
of other inputs except labor (which had a large supply elasticity of
of 2.6), and concluded
concluded
that 92 percent of the benefits from U.S. farm programs went to landowners, and the
other 8 percent went to suppliers of labor. The problem with this analysis is that Rosine
and Heimberger
Helmberger (1974) modeled agriculture as a single industry, as though a single
uniform policy applied to every commodity. The assumptions made in either study
may be appropriate in some context or at some level of aggregation, but Gisser (1993)
failed to match his parameters to his commodity aggregates, and Rosine and HeImberger
Helmberger
(1974) could not match their policy instrument to theirs.

4.3.3.
Input subsidy
subsidy
4.3.3. Input
To represent an input subsidy of il
f31 =
il. The
"gl per unit on input I,
1, we set a
oe =
= 0 and fll
= £1
elf1.
corresponding relative changes in prices and quantities are shown in the second column
in Table 3. Because the subsidy reduces the price output suppliers must pay for the

20 e is the elasticity of output supply: e = {eIe2 + a(kle 1 + k2e2)}/{a + kle 2 + k2e I }.
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equation for
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dln X2, suppliers
suppliers of X2 will always prefer a subsidy on output over a subsidy on the
other input
input (again, unless a
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suppliers of X2 are indifferent
indifferent between
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4.3.4. Quotas
Quotas on output
output or
or an input
input

The same model can be used
used to explore
explore the implications
implications of quantitative
quantitative restrictions
restrictions
on inputs or on output, as done by Floyd (1965), for example.
example. The effects of
introducing a quota on output can be analyzed using the solutions above, by making
the effective demand perfectly inelastic (by setting 170 =
= 0 in the solutions) and defining
the displacement
displacement as a quantity reduction using aot =
--- -8Q
- 8 0 (where 8Q is the proportional
reduction in quantity from the competitive solution) so that (la
(1 a /~)) becomes dIn
dln Q
Q = -8Q.
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The effects on price and consumer surplus are obtained using dIn
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11 is the actual demand
demand elasticity (in absolute
absolute value terms). Similarly, the effects of
introducing a quota on one input, X
I, can be analyzed by making
X1,
making the effective supply of
that factor perfectly inelastic
inelastic (81
(el = 0) and defining the displacement
displacement as a quantity shift
b y /(31
~ =
= -01
-31 (where 01
~1 is the proportional
proportional reduction from the competitive solution) so
by
that (ld
(ld /~)) becomes dIn
din XI
X1 = -01.
-31. The last two columns in Table 3 show the effects of a
quota that reduces output
Q, and a quota that reduces the quantity of XI
output by a fraction 0
3Q,
X1
by a fraction 01,
3l, respectively.
An output
output quota raises the consumer
consumer price and reduces the demand
demand for both inputs,
harming
harming consumers and suppliers
suppliers of both inputs. These effects are offset partially
partially by the
quota rents accruing to quota owners: only quota owners benefit, and their benefits are
smaller
smaller than the costs imposed
imposed on consumers and input suppliers.
suppliers. The consumer
consumer share of
the cost of the output quota depends
depends on the elasticity of demand
demand relative to the elasticity
of output supply. The distribution
distribution of the cost between
between input suppliers
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This is identical
identical to the ratio of the benefits to the input suppliers
suppfiers from an output subsidy,
only now the effects are negative: suppliers
suppliers of an input
input bear
bear more of the cost of an output
quota, the less elastic is the supply of the input
input or the bigger is its share of costs.
An input quota also raises the output price, resulting
resulting in losses to consumers.
consumers.
Assuming that they own the quota, suppliers
suppliers of input I1 gain from a quota on XI
X1 (in
the relevant range of quota quantities,
quantities, their losses as suppliers
suppliers of XI
X1 from the reduction
in quantity are more than offset by their gains in quota rent).22
rent). 22 Suppliers
Suppliers of the other
input, X2, may gain or lose, depending on whether
whether the two inputs are gross substitutes
substitutes
(o- > 11),
0), in which case they gain, or gross complements (a
(~r < 11),
~), in which case they
(a
lose. These
I: when
These results are opposite those for a subsidy on X
XI:
when the two inputs are
gross substitutes,
substitutes, suppliers
suppliers of X2 lose as a result of a subsidy on XI but gain when
when
the quantity of XI
X1 is restricted
restricted by a quota. Thus, for example,
example, landowners
landowners are likely to
favor acreage allotments over output quotas, and they may be supported
supported in this view by
suppliers
suppliers of other inputs that are close substitutes
substitutes for land.
4.3.5. Combining
Combining instruments
As discussed
discussed above, single instruments
instruments are likely to be less efficient than multiple
multiple
instruments
instruments combined. In the single-market
single-market model, we saw that an output
output quota at
the competitive quantity, combined
combined with an output
output subsidy, would be equivalent
equivalent to a
lump-sum
producers (more precisely, to whoever owns the quotas). We also
lump-sum transfer to producers
saw that it would be more efficient to set the quota below the competitive quantity
if the social opportunity cost of government
per dollar of
government spending
spending were 1 + 0
~ dollars per
spending. The same ideas apply in the same ways in the context of the two-factor model,
22
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with a less-aggregated view of producer surplus. That is, if the objective of a policy were
X I, an efficient policy would be to combine an input
to transfer income to suppliers of X1,
quota on X
X1I (set so its marginal cost per dollar of benefit to the input suppliers is I1 +
÷ 8)
X1.
with a subsidy on X
I.
The effects of combining an output subsidy with an input quota, a common policy in
the United States, can be seen by combining the elements in the first and last columns
of Table 3. The elements in the first column have to be adjusted to reflect the fixed
supply of land, by setting £1
el = 0, before they are added to the elements in the last
column. In a typical representation, the effects on output and producer prices are likely
to be in the same direction as with an output subsidy alone (i.e., both quantity and
producer price increase), but the magnitudes of changes are reduced by the input quota.
Of course, an input quota could be set such that output is less than the competitive
quantity, more than offsetting the effects of the subsidy on quantity produced. Thus the
effect on consumption and the consumer price is ambiguous, depending on parameter
values and the size of the transfer. The effect of the combined policy on the rental price
for land is unambiguously positive. If the two inputs were gross substitutes (a
(a > 17),
7),
then the input quota on land and the output subsidy both would act to increase the
demand for X2, causing its price and quantity to rise with benefits to the suppliers. If
land and X2 were gross complements, however, X2 and W2
W2 may rise or fall.
Understanding some subtler policy choices may require a finer disaggregation into
Understanding
a larger number of groups that have distinct interests. Some [e.g., Babcock, Carter and
Schmitz (1990)] have suggested that agribusiness interests (including
(including both suppliers
of inputs purchased by farmers and suppliers of inputs combined with farm products
in processing) are politically influential, and thus there is merit in considering the
understand policy
incidence
incidence of policy alternatives on agribusiness in attempting to understand
23
choices. To do this requires a less aggregative model. 23

5. Supply
S u p p l y controls
controls - some
s o m e extensions
extensions to the
the analysis
analysis
Thus far, the welfare effects of policies have been analyzed under a number of assumptions. We now begin to consider how the results may change when some of these assumptions are relaxed, and more realistic policy and market characteristics are introduced. First, in the present section (Section 5), we consider the implications for the
analysis of quotas when we allow for limits on transferability, endogenous quality, quotas on inputs (as a proxy for output), and quotas under variability. Then, in subsequent
subsequent
sections we consider some further extensions to models for a more general set of policies, including
including other aspects of variability (Section 6), enforcement costs (Section 7),
and dynamic responses (Section 8).
23 For instance,
Alston, Carter
Wohlgenant (1989)
two-factor model
model to a three-factor
three-factor model
model
23
instance, Alston,
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5.1. Quota
Quota ownership
ownership and
and transferability
In the analysis above, it was assumed that quota was given to producers, so that quota
rents may be included in producer surplus.
surplus. This assumption may be accurate for a new
quota scheme, since quota is usually allocated to producers based on past production so
that initially,
initially, quota owners are also producers. When the quota is freely transferable by
lease or sale, as is often assumed, the interests of quota owners and producers become
increasingly disparate over time. This arises because the original quota recipients
receive a windfall gain of the quota rents accruing over the life of the policy (or the
equivalent value by selling the quota), regardless of whether they continue to produce
or continue to own the quota. On the other hand, producers who purchase or lease quota
incur quota rents as a cost of production. As a result,
result, in many instances, it is appropriate
to treat quota rents separately from quasi-rents accruing to the suppliers of other inputs.
The distinction between producers and quota owners adds one complication to the
standard analysis of a quota. Another is introduced when restrictions on the transferability of quota are imposed. There are usually limits on who may buy or lease quota,
whether they are allowed to lease or must buy the asset, and how much quota an individual may own or use. In addition, there are often rules that make transfers inefficient
(e.g.,
(e.g., regulated rental or purchase prices, restrictions on when transfers may occur or the
size of transactions, or a requirement that all transfers must be made through a regulatory agency). If any of the restrictions are binding, then quota will not be allocated to the
most efficient producers, costs will not be minimized, and the umestricted
unrestricted marginal cost
curve is no longer relevant. Higher production costs arising from restrictions on quota
ownership or use may mean a reduction in producer quasi-rents, a reduction in quota
rents, or both, but unambiguously reduce both the sum of quasi-rents and quota rents,
24 Barichello
B arichello and Cunningham-Dunlop (1987) documented comand net social welfare. 24
prehensively the nature of the restrictions on quota ownership and transfer in Canadian
agriculture and the sources of efficiency loss that they entailed.
The efficiency loss resulting from restrictions on quota transfer has been the subject
of several empirical studies,
studies, but has been more often ignored in both theoretical and
empirical analysis of quotas in agriculture. Alston (1986) estimated that limits on transferability of hen quota increased the costs of producing eggs in Victoria, Australia, by
approximately 20 percent. Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) evaluated the implications of restrictions on inter-county transfers of U.S. flue-cured tobacco quota. They
found that a move to free transferability would increase quota rents by 3.5 percent,
but would also entail a 2.1 percent loss of producer surplus accruing to growers. Bureau et al. (1997) found that cross-border transferability of sugar quota in the European
Union would result in a very substantial redistribution of production with important effects on net welfare and quota rents - even within country transferability would confer
24
beyond the
24 In
In addition,
addition, going
goingbeyond
the static
static analysis,
analysis, Lermer
Lermerand
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considerable benefits. A number of studies have considered the implications of transferable quotas for milk. The issue of milk quota transferability in New South Wales
was modeled by Neutze (1961), Parish (1963), Lloyd (1971), and more recently measured by Lembit et al. (1988), Tozer (1993), and Drynan et al. (1994). Milk quotas were
introduced in the European Community in 1984 and have been much analyzed since,
introduced
beginning with Burrell (1989). Recent studies measuring the benefits of transferable
quotas include Guyomard et al. (1996) for French milk, and Boots, Oude-Lansink and
Peedings
Peerlings (1997) for Dutch milk.
Despite the deadweight costs associated with limits on transferability, imperfectly
transferable quotas continue to be the norm. Sieper (1982, p. 65) suggested that the law
of restricted quota transferability "may be as well established as the law of demand"
and hence, such restrictions should not be assumed away lightly when analyzing quota
policies.
5.2. Quotas
Quotas and
and quality
quality

The typical policy analysis assumes that the commodity of interest is homogeneous.
However, commodities are rarely homogeneous, and output controls can lead to
distortions in the mix of qualities produced. That the United States produces and exports
high-quality flue-cured tobacco, while importing low-quality tobacco, is thought to be
- at least in part - a response to the tobacco marketing quotas. Such quality responses
to quantity controls can be seen in terms of the Alchian
Alehian and Allen (1964) theorem and
Barzel's (1976) alternative approach to taxation.
The Alchian
Alehian and Allen theorem concerns the effects of per unit costs on the relative
consumption of high-quality and low-quality goods. The original example concerned
"good" and "bad" grapes grown in California. From an individual consumer's perspective, prices are fixed, and the price of each quality of grapes for a consumer in, say, New
York increases by the transportation cost. Thus, good grapes become relatively cheaper
for a consumer in New York, and hence, a New Yorker will consume a larger proportion
of good grapes compared with a person in California who has identical preferences and
Borcherding and Silmeans. An analogous result holds for producers, as described by Borcherding
berberg (1978) in their analysis of why Washington apple growers "ship the good apples
out". The Alchian
Alehian and Allen theorem holds for individual consumers and producers under certain conditions, and applies for any per unit cost that meets criteria described by
Umbeck (1980). Such costs include
include per unit taxes and quota rents, the only difference
being that the tax rate is exogenous while quota rent is endogenously determined by the
interactions of supply and demand, given the quota quantity.
Barzel (1976) addressed a similar phenomenon
phenomenon at the market level in his alternative
approach to taxation. Barzel noted that every commodity is more or less a bundle
bundle
of characteristics. If a per unit tax is imposed, the tax statute will use a subset of
characteristics to define the commodity, assuming that an exhaustive description is
either impossible or very costly. As a result, the per unit tax is actually taxing the
defining characteristics. In maximizing their profits subject to the tax, producers may

alter the characteristics included in their units of production. Barzel
B arzel (1976) showed that
the quantity of the defining characteristics (specified in the tax statute) will decrease,
and the other characteristics will increase on a per unit basis.
Just as the specification of a per unit tax will use some characteristics to define
a "unit", so will the specification of a production quota. In general, a quota will be
specified in terms of the commodity's physical characteristics, e.g., weight. Quota
rents act as a per unit tax, so that Barzel's model can be applied and used to predict
that, although the physical quantity of a commodity is restricted by the quota, other
characteristics of the commodity, which implicitly define its quality, will increase. Thus,
a quota will lead to an increase in quality.
To estimate the welfare effects of quality responses to an output quota, James (2000)
specified a model of two qualities of the same commodity, and imposed a quota to be
allocated between the two markets. The average quality, measured as the proportion of
production and consumption in the high-quality market, increased as the quota quantity
was reduced. The increase in quality increased the producer benefits (exclusive of quota
rent) and decreased the consumer losses from a given quota quantity, relative to the
case where quality was held constant. However, the quota rent generated by a given
quota quantity was smaller than that generated in the constant-quality case, reducing
the efficiency of the policy as a means of transferring income to producers. When
producers alter the quality of their production in response to a quota policy, the actual
transfer achieved from a given quota is smaller and a more restrictive quota must be
imposed in order to achieve the desired transfer, relative to the case where quality
remains unchanged.
unchanged.

5.3. Output versus input controls and slippage
Production
Production quotas as such are rarely observed. Usually, quotas restrict quantities
quantItIes
industries where
marketed rather than those produced, and are typically found in industries
production is relatively controllable (e.g., tobacco, where weather effects on yields are
industries where marketing is controlled and a secondary market
relatively small) or in industries
or storage is available to absorb excess production (e.g., manufacturing milk markets
When output
output quotas have been used
absorb production in excess of fluid milk quotas). When
not controlled,
controlled, producers have
which production
production or marketing is not
for commodities for which
found ways to subvert the quota, either legally or illegally. For instance, a marketing
quota on feedgrains can be subverted by vertically integrating
integrating a grain enterprise with
quota
of this type occurred
occurred during
during the Australian
Australian
a livestock enterprise. Some response of
experiment with wheat
wheat delivery quotas during
during 1969-1975.
1969-1975.
of controlling
controlling production
production or
or marketing of
of output
output may explain, in part,
The difficulty of
input quotas in agriculture,
agriculture, especially acreage limitations on
on crops.
the importance of input
been used
used as a proxy for output
output controls. In many cases, inputs
inputs
Input controls may have been
hen quotas were used
used to
are easier to control and measure than output. For instance, hen
Australian and Canadian
Canadian egg industries
industries because the raw farm
control supply in the Australian

product in that industry is ready for final consumption, making production virtually
impossible to monitor.
Although input controls may be easier to enforce, they can be less effective as a
25 Given
control over production, and less efficient than output quotas in other senses.
sensesY
an input restriction, producers will inevitably alter their production decisions in order
to make the costs of that restriction less binding. The most immediate response may be
to use the highest quality of the restricted input (e.g., the most fertile land) so that the
average productivity of that input increases. In addition, producers will likely intensify
their use of other inputs, so that production is greater than it would have been if input
proportions had remained unchanged. In the longer run, new varieties or production
technologies may be adopted in order to increase output given the input restriction.
All of these effects reduce the effectiveness of an input quota in restricting output, a
phenomenon often referred to as "slippage".
With acreage controls, slippage is manifested in yield increases. The extent of
slippage under acreage restrictions is governed by the elasticity of substitution between
land and other inputs. If this elasticity is zero, output is reduced in proportion to the
reduction in land use, and there is no slippage. If it is not zero, output is reduced by
a smaller proportion than land is, and in order to achieve a given effect on output, an
even tighter restriction on the input is necessary. Some studies have found slippage to
be quite substantial.
The combination of acreage restrictions with price supports may have encouraged
the adoption of varieties and cultural practices that increased yield at the expense
of quality, as noted by Brandow (1977, pp. 258). For instance, Foster and Babcock
(1990, 1993) estimated that the use of acreage allotments for tobacco had a very
significant effect on both the level and the growth rate of tobacco yields, as was
shown after the switch to poundage (marketing) quotas in 1965, when yields fell by
12 percent. Tobacco quality is said to have fallen under
under input allotments and risen under
poundage quotas [e.g., Seagraves (1983)].
(1983)]. Similarly, James and Alston (2002)
(2002) found
poundage
reduction in an index of French
French wheat quality in response
a statistically significant reduction
Agricultural
to set-asides implemented as part of the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy.
agricultural production
production may have impliEnvironmental externalities associated with agricultural
26
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When
between input controls and output
output controls. 26
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correction for another
another distortion,
distortion, such as an environmental exprovide a second-best correction
be more efficient than output
output controls; indeed,
indeed, they could
could improve
ternality, they may be
net welfare. Input controls that
that lead
lead to intensification
intensification of
of production
production in order
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net

Section 4 to compare an input quota on
25 We can use the equilibrium displacement model presented in Section
Xl,
quota, both of which reduce output and raise output price by the same amount, by fixing
X
1, and an output quota,
~Q
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26 Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986)
(1986) modeled the effects
effects of a target-price
target-price cum deficiency-payment
deficiency-payment scheme
in the presence of environmental
environmental externalities.
externalities.

yields (e.g.,
(e.g., output per cow, per hen, or per acre) might reduce or increase externalities associated with agricultural production. For instance, an acreage control will lead
to an increase in the intensity of chemical use on the restricted acreage and may lead to
an overall increase or decrease in agricultural chemical use (depending on the relative
sizes of the scale and substitution effects). Therefore, an acreage control may increase or
decrease the potential for externalities from agricultural chemicals. An increase seems
more likely than a decrease in this case, especially since it seems likely that some externalities are a function of the intensity of use of a polluting input, more than a function
27 Alternatively, if a quota were applied to chemical inputs, rather than
of the total use. 27
to land or output, output would be reduced and there would be a clear advantage of
reduced chemical pollution. Similarly, hen quotas are likely to reduce any externalities
associated with effluent disposal and might reduce them better than would an output
quota that resulted in the same quantity of eggs produced.

5.4. Quotas and
and variability
A number of studies have examined the effect of variability of supply or demand on
the impacts of quotas. Variability in supply or demand can change the market outcomes
under a quota, and may accordingly alter the effects of the quota on welfare and its
distribution. A marketing (or production) quota insulates input suppliers from the effects
of demand variability, but exacerbates the effects of demand variability on output price
(by making supply perfectly inelastic). As a result, consumer welfare and quota rent
have to absorb all of the variability from demand. By the same token, consumers are
insulated from variability in supply (or marginal cost), which is absorbed entirely by
changes in producer welfare and quota rent.
Variability may also influence the producers' planned production choices under
marketing quotas. Alston and Quilkey (1980) presented some heuristic arguments,
suggesting that risk-neutral producers would be expected to aim to overproduce,
on average, when production is uncertain. More recent studies have formalized and
extended this analysis, with mixed results [e.g., Fraser (1986, 1995),
1995), Babcock (1990),
and Borges and Thurman (1994)].
Variability may also imply some response by policymakers when markets change.
When demand grows under a quota, either price must rise to clear the market, or
the quota quantity must increase, or some combination of the two must happen.
How the policy is allowed to adjust to accommodate the changes in the market has
distributional implications. Sumner and Wohlgenant (1985) raised this issue in relation
to the incidence of cigarette taxes on the U.S. tobacco market, Sumner and Alston
(1984) elaborate on the same point in relation to more general shifts in demand for
tobacco, and Brown and Martin (1996) provide some further results.
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6. Variability, stabilization, and policy risk

The inherent
inherent variability in agricultural markets is widely recognized. In fact, it is
often used as a justification for government intervention. Many policies have been
implemented in the guise of stabilization but have their primary effect on raising the
average returns to producers. As well as influencing the goals and rationale for policies,
variability may change the incidence of a given policy. Policies that have the same
incidence in a static sense, or the same incidence when supply and demand are at their
expected values, may have entirely different incidence
incidence when supply or demand shift, or
when actual values are realized. This section discusses issues related to variability, its
effects on the typical static welfare analysis, and the trade-off between market risk and
policy risk created by government intervention.
6.1. The stabilization trade-off

As was shown above for the case of a production quota, in general, policies that stabilize
one dimension of the market (e.g., quantity) will inevitably increase the variability in
some other dimension (e.g., price, quota rent, producer welfare, or consumer welfare).
This is a common theme in the literature on stabilization policies. Policies that reduce
price variability or output variability at the farm level are likely to destabilize some
other variable, such as gross or net revenue, which may be a more relevant target for
stabilization. Indeed, some policies might reduce the year-to-year variation in prices
while increasing the odds of a market collapse. 28
28 Some such policies have stabilized
prices, quantities, gross revenues, or net incomes for some market participants, but in
doing so they have increased the variability experienced by others.
Several studies have examined this phenomenon
phenomenon in the context of trade policies
and the variability of international
international prices. Johnson (1975, 1991) analyzed worldwide
impacts of domestic agricultural policies and concluded, as Josling (1977) did, that freer
world trade would lessen international
international price variability for most agricultural products.
Sarris and Freebairn (1983) showed that, in the case of wheat, free trade would provide
generally much higher and less variable world prices. 29
29 These studies showed that
variability must be accommodated by adjustments somewhere in the market, and if
one avenue for adjustment is closed (e.g., prices in one country), others must carry
more of the burden. The variable import levies implemented as part of the Common
Union provide an excellent example. Under
Under this
Agricultural Policy
Poficy in the European Union
policy, import tariffs were varied in order to offset changes in the world price, so
that internal commodity prices in the European Union were held constant. However,
this policy increased the variability of world prices by two means. First, none of the

28
28 Brian Wright (personal communication) likened a buffer stock scheme to eliminating the minor bumps in
the road in exchange for introducing a 100-foot drop somewhere down the road; an odd notion of stabilization.
29 See studies in Sumner (1988), especially cautionary comments by Bruce Gardner (pp. 170-173).
170-173).

variability originating from other countries was accommodated by the European Union.
Second, the policy meant that any variability in EU supply and demand had to be
absorbed by international
international markets.
6.2. Welfare analysis in variable markets

A number of issues arise when we modify the typical static welfare analysis to account
for variation in a market. One such issue is that the equivalence between certain policies
in a static setting may break down. For instance, in our initial discussion of a target-price
deficiency payments program, we noted that in a static setting this would be equivalent
to a per unit subsidy (of PI
Pl - P2 in Figure 1). However, this is not true when supply or
demand changes.
Consider a parallel, outward shift in demand. In the case of a target-price policy,
unchanged, while the consumer price
producer price, and thus production, remain unchanged,
increases and taxpayer costs are reduced, with a reduction in deadweight
deadweight loss. In the
case of a constant per unit subsidy, the same demand shift results in increased producer
and consumer prices, increases in production and consumption, and an increase in
taxpayer costs, but no change in deadweight loss. After demand has shifted, a smaller
required to achieve the same effect on producer welfare as the original
per unit subsidy is required
instruments is conditional
target price policy. In other words, the equivalence among instruments
conditional on
3o
a given set of market conditions. 3°
In addition to leading to a breakdown of equivalence among policy instruments,
incidence of policy will differ from the
variability means that the expected (ex ante) incidence
incidence are
actual (ex post) incidence. Furthermore, because measures of policy incidence
nonlinear functions of random variables (prices and quantities),
quantities), the expected incidence
incidence
nonlinear
incidence when markets are at their expected values. Those
may differ from the incidence
engaged in measuring assistance to agriculture often look backwards at the actual
redistribution conferred by a policy rather than what may have been intended
intended
income redistribution
conditions were realized. In some settings, or for some
or anticipated before market conditions
questions, the ex post measure may be misleading.
A floor price scheme is a good example. Suppose the government guarantees
producers a minimum price for their commodity. In the typical ex post analysis, if the
binding, it would be concluded
concluded that the policy had not conferred
price floor had not been binding,
any benefits on producers, as if the policy had not existed. However, an ex ante measure
would take into account the implicit assistance from the policy, which is based on the
Bardsley
probability that the floor price would be binding. B
ardsley and Cashin (1990), following
Gardner (1977),
(1977), suggested that the assistance provided by a government minimum price
guarantee is equal to the value of an equivalent put option, and this value can be assessed

30 In addition to domestic demand and supply conditions, when the commodity of interest is traded, changes
policies applied domestically or
in export demand or import supply may also break down the equivalence of poficies
at the border [e.g., see Tyers and Falvey (1988),
(1988), Falvey and Lloyd (1991)].
(1991)].

using
using the
the Black-Scholes
Black-Scholes formula. Thus,
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whether the
the price
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binding or
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not, the
the
that it will
will bind
bind amounts
amounts to aa transfer of
of benefits to producers
producers from taxpayers.
possibility that
and Cashin
Cashin (1990,
(1990, p. 219)
219) estimated
estimated that
that the underwriting
underwriting assistance provided
provided
Bardsley and
Australian taxpayers to Australian
Australian wheat
wheat growers worth
worth about
an implicit transfer from Australian
A$20-40 million
million per
per year from 1979/80
1979/80 through
through 1985/86,
1985/86, equivalent
equivalent to a subsidy rate
A$20-40
of about 2-4
2-4 percent.
of

Producer and
and policy
policy responses
responses
6.3. Producer
of market variability also have indirect
indirect
that affect the degree of
Variability and policies that
producers may respond
respond systematically to policies that
that change
change price
effects. Risk averse producers
addition, changes
changes in market conditions
conditions may provoke policy responses.
variability. In addition,
Innes and Rausser (1989)
(1989) considered
considered the implications of
of price stabilization
stabilization for the
incidence
incidence of the stereotypical U.S. commodity programs. They argued that if producers
contingent claim (e.g., insurance) markets are incomplete, price
are risk averse and contingent
stabilization will induce a supply response. As a result, producers may produce more
guaranteed price than they would
would for the same expected price. This producer
for a given guaranteed
response will modify the incidence
incidence of the policy. In addition, a policy that stabilizes
prices or net incomes can confer welfare gains even when there is no behavioral
under certain assumptions about risk attitudes [see also Moschini
Moschini (1984) and
response, under
Innes (1990)].
(1990)]. Innes and Rausser (1989) suggested that these effects could be so large
that the conventional welfare implications of a target price with deficiency payments
are reversed: producers can be made worse off, and society as a whole, better off. The
authors also derived conditions under which production controls would improve net
social welfare, but they showed that, in this case, the static effects on producers and
consumers would not be reversed by the introduction of risk and risk aversion.
As noted above, market variability alters the incidence of policies. From a policymaker's perspective, then, a policy must adjust to market conditions and the induced
producer responses in order for it to have the intended effects. Some studies have allowed for endogenous policy responses to changes in market conditions [e.g., Rausser
and Freebairn (1974), Sarris and Freebairn (1983), Rausser and Foster (1990)] and, indeed, some have advocated the adoption of flexible policy rules so that policies would
adapt optimally when market conditions change [e.g., Just (1984, 1985), Love and
Rausser (1997)]. Of course, perfect adjustment for market variation requires perfect
foresight regarding supply or demand shocks, producer responses to policies, and the
hypothetical price and quantity at which the market would clear if it were undistorted.
The danger of designing a policy whose operation and success depends on such perfect
3l
collapsed.31
foresight is exemplified by buffer stock schemes, which have all, ultimately, collapsed.
Under buffer stock schemes, government purchases are made when the market price
is expected to be "too low", and stocks are released when the market price is expected
31 Wright
Wright(1993)
(1993) discusses
discussesthe
the dynamic
dynamicincidence
incidence of
of agricultural
agriculturalpolicies
policiesgenerally,
generally,with
with some
someemphasis
emphasison
on
31
floor-price
floor-priceschemes.
schemes.

to be "too high". The success of such schemes, then, relies
reties on the ability of government
operators to beat the market. While this may be possible in some time periods, Wright
and Williams (1988) and Williams and Wright
Wright (1991, pp. 396-397)
396-397) note that budgetary
constraints will eventually bind, either because of imperfect foresight or because of
prolonged periods requiring government purchases. Bardsley (1994) documented the
1989 collapse of the Australian wool reserve price scheme (essentially a buffer stock
scheme). Before its collapse, the scheme eliminated A$1.8 billion of reserve funds, and
left wool growers with a debt of A$2.7 billion and a wool stockpile, much of which
remained unsold ten years later.
6.4. Policy risk
A hypothetical benevolent government might introduce agricultural policies to reduce
price variability experienced by producers, making risk averse producers and society
better off, as suggested by Moschini
Moschini (1984) and by Innes and Rausser (1989). However,
the same intervention introduces another source of risk, policy risk: the risk that
producers will experience a loss arising from changes in policy or a policy-induced
market collapse. Hence, any government intervention in a commodity market is likely
to involve elements of policy risk, and any policy designed to mitigate market risk will
entail at best a trade-off between market risk and policy risk.
Just and Rausser (1984, p. 129) presented a comprehensive discussion of how the
design of policies can affect producer uncertainty and concluded
concluded that, "The inherent
inherent
instability and riskiness of the U.S. food and agriculture system is the market-failure
justification for U.S. agricultural policy. The implementation of policies to address such
market failures is often confronted with government failure. Political-administrative
instabilities resulting from government failure can exceed the inherent instabilities of
the private sector".
Evidence about policy risk has been inferred by some from the rates of capitalization
of quota rents into quota asset prices. For instance, Lermer and Stanbury (1985)
estimated that costs of policy risk offset half or more of potential producer benefits from
supply management for eggs, broilers, and turkeys in Canada. Lermer and Stanbury
(1985) attributed all of the premium in the quota rental rate (rents as a percentage of
the quota value), above a risk-free rate of return, to diversifiable risk, which would
not exist if quota were held in fully diversified portfolios; hence, it represents an
unnecessary cost of "insurance" against loss of the quota income stream. Alston (1992),
however, suggested that some of the premium must reflect the equivalent of actuarially
fair insurance, so that Lermer and Stanbury (1985) probably overstated the cost of
unnecessary risk-bearing from limited quota transferability.32
transferability. 32
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Other studies have sought to identify the capitalization of commodity programs
into land prices. Various authors have proposed that government payments may be
discounted more heavily than income from the market, when they are capitalized into
land values [e.g., Just and Miranowski (1993), Clark, Klein and Thompson (1993),
Schmitz (1995), Weersink et al. (1999)]. This could simply reflect an expectation that
government program payments will not persist, which may have been an accurate
prediction, and need not imply any risk premium as such, nor any waste of the type
identified by Lermer and Stanbury (1985). On the other hand, the discounting could
contain an element of policy risk and excessive risk costs.

administration and enforcement
enforcement
7. Costs of administration

All of the analysis above ignores the costs of administration and enforcement of policies.
Once we allow for these costs, taxpayers as an interest group are affected by regulatory
instruments such as quotas, not just
just the instruments that involve subsidies and taxes.
Taxpayers bear the costs of administration and enforcement and receive as benefits
revenues raised from fines imposed as penalties. These costs therefore change the
qualitative implications of policies, as well as their quantitative implications, in terms
of the distribution of benefits and costs, optimal instrument combinations and settings,
and transfer efficiency.
Costs of administration and enforcement may be quite substantial, and may differ
among policies. The processes of initially allocating quota and dealing with the
inevitable appeals for reallocation can be very costly,
cosily, as is well known to anyone who
has witnessed them at close hand; every producer (or other presumptive quota owner)
must be dealt with on an individual basis. Similarly, substantial costs of negotiation
and rent-seeking arise whenever the elimination of a quota is seriously contemplated
by government. The processes involved in introducing
introducing or eliminating a subsidy, on the
other hand, are much simpler (and presumably less expensive). The costs of introducing
introducing
or modifying policies may be more important than the conventional measures of
deadweight costs, yet we usually have no information on these costs and leave them
out of the analysis.
Once policies have been introduced,
introduced, the administrative costs may be relatively low, so
long as producers and consumers willingly comply. But some policies create incentives
for producers or consumers to break the policy rules, and there is some evidence that
participants in agricultural commodity markets will respond to such incentives. 33
33 We
need to extend our models to account for optimizing behavior in those cases where it
is profitable to break the rules, or where accounting for cheating will lead to significant
changes in implications of policies. This requires taking into account the market incentives to break the rules, the odds of being caught, and the penalties. In addition, many
33
when the egg
market in the state
Victoria, Australia,
Australia, was
was supposedly
being controlled
by
33 For instance,
instance, when
egg market
state of Victoria,
supposedlybeing
controlled by
was estimated
black market
market accounted
percent of all
hen quotas,
quotas, it was
estimatedthat
that the
the black
accountedfor
for 10-30
10-30 percent
all eggs
eggs [Alston
[Alston(1986)].
(1986)].

aspects of enforcement are chosen by policymakers when they choose how vigorously
to enforce policies and what penalties to apply to those who are caught in violation, and
this too can be modeled. Finally, the direct costs of enforcement must be added.
At one level, this calls for no more than a routine application of the economics of
crime and punishment
punishment for which there is an extensive literature, beginning with Becker
(1968). Surprisingly, perhaps, the literature on agricultural policy has had very little
to say on these matters. Some recent work by Giannakas (1998), and Giannakas and
Fulton (2000a, 2000b, 200
I a, 200
Ib) has redressed a significant part of this deficiency,
2001a,
2001b)
but much remains to be done. As will be seen below, the economic problem of analyzing
a policy with cheating and enforcement costs, where the policy rules and enforcement
effort are endogenous, along with the settings of the instruments, has many dimensions.
Dealing with all of those dimensions makes for an intractable problem; assuming them
away restricts the generality of the results. Here we will add some components of
of
imperfect enforcement, but restrict attention to some special, comparatively easy cases.

7.1.
7.1. Quotas and cheating
Suppose we have an output quota policy with costly (and, therefore, probably
incomplete) enforcement [this policy is modeled in detail by Giannakas and Fulton
(200Ia)].
(2001a)]. In Figure 10, the unregulated supply and demand are represented by S
Q would result in supply of S
SQ,
and D. If effective, a quota of Q Q
Q, yielding a price
of Pl.
P1. At this price, producers would want to produce QI,
Q1, which is more than the
competitive quantity, Qo. How much they will produce beyond their quota will depend
not only on the odds of being caught and the penalty imposed if they are caught, but
also on how those odds and penalties vary with the size of over-quota production.
In addition, producers may be able to influence the odds of being caught by taking
certain precautions, at a cost. Taking all these considerations into account, we can
imagine a regulated supply function, SR, that coincides with the unregulated supply
function for quantities less than the quota, but lies above it for over-quota production,
reflecting the costs of cheating (including
(including costs of avoiding detection and expected costs
of punishment), added to the ordinary costs ofproduction.
of production. 34
34
As the regulated supply curve is drawn in Figure 10, the marginal costs of crime and
punishment perceived by producers are initially infinitesimally small (perhaps reflecting
punishment
that the odds of being caught or that the penalties when caught are negligible for small
amounts of over-quota sales) but rise with the size of over-quota production. This could
reflect a positive effect of increasing over-quota production on either the chance of being
caught, the costs of avoiding detection, or the penalty per unit of over-quota production.
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Table
Table 4
Welfare effects
effects of a quota
quota with
withandwithout
cheating
Welfare
and without cheating
Changes
Changes in

Producer Surplus
Surplus (!'.PS)
(APS)
Producer
Consumer Surplus
Surplus (!'.CS)
(ACS)
Consumer
NationalSurplus(ANS=-DWL)
National Surplus (!'.NS=-DWL)

Quota with
Quota
no cheating
cheating

Quota with
Quota
cheating
cheating

Effect of
Effect
cheating
cheating

A
+ C - (I +
+J+
+ K)
A+
-(A +
+B+
+ C+
+E+
+F+
+ G)
-(A
- ( B + E +EF+
+G
+ I + J + K )+ J +K)
-(B+
F+G+I

+ E - (J +
+ K)
C+
-(C +
+E+
+F+
+ G)
-(C
- ( F + G + J + KJ )+ K)
-(F+G+

E+
+I- A
A

A+
+ B
B ++E
E + I+1

Note:
entries in this
this table
table refer to areas
areas in Figure
Figure 10.
10.
Note: The entries

Thus,
R, is between
between the
Thus, the regulated output
output that is actually sold on the market, Q
QR,
quota quantity, and the corresponding regulated price, PR,
competitive quantity and the quota
is between
between the competitive price and the quota
quota price. Several interesting welfare effects
can be
be seen in this figure, as summarized
summarized in Table 4. Under
Under the perfectly (and costlessly)
enforced
enforced output
output quota, producers (who
(who are assumed
assumed also to own
own the quota) would
would gain
+ C) - (/
(I +
+ J
J +
+ K).
K ) . If
If producers cheat
cheat and expand
expand their production
area (A +
production to QR, they
+ E)
E) - (J
(J +
+ K).
K ) . Producer
Producer benefits are lower by A - (E
(E +
+ 1)
I ) when
when
gain only area (C +
the quotas are imperfectly enforced. However, the black market returns, area E +
÷ II,, do
not necessarily go to quota
quota owners. In addition, area E +
+ I represents net returns after
deducting the expected taxpayer benefits from fines (which also should be deducted
from the deadweight losses). Consumer
Consumer losses are smaller, by
b y area A +
+ B, as are net
social costs, by area B +
+ E +
+ II..

How does cheating affect transfer efficiency? If we were able to impose a fully enforceable output quota of QR
Q/~ it would achieve greater producer benefits than the imperfectly enforceable quota set at QQ, with a smaller deadweight
deadweight loss. For the same
reason, then, for a given producer benefit, transfer efficiency is lower under an imperfectly enforced output quota than under a perfectly enforced output quota. In addition,
the net costs of enforcement must be added to the other deadweight losses, further reducing the efficiency of transfers (even more so when tax revenues with a marginal cost
of 1 +
+ 83 are used to fund enforcement efforts). Policymakers can make the policy more
like a perfectly enforced quota by increasing enforcement effort (which would shift S
R
SR
further towards S
Q), but this is simply a trade-off between the costs of enforcement and
SQ),
the deadweight losses in the commodity market. If that trade-off has been optimized
SR represents the least-cost regulated supply function.
already, then SR
Figure 10 could also be used to represent the contrast between an output quota (set
at Q Q) and an input quota set at the quantity that would be used to produce Q Q in
35 In this case, however, the difference between Sand
S and
the absence of intervention. 35
S
R reflects the increased cost of production under an input quota arising from the
SR
intensification of the use of other (nonquota) inputs, or slippage. In both cases, what we
see is evidence of producers incurring expenses in order to circumvent the constraint
of the quota, either the costs of cheating or the costs of distorting the input mix. This
observation makes it easier to understand
understand how input quotas are sometimes chosen over
output quotas to achieve the same goal. Holding enforcement costs constant, an input
QUOTA.
quota would be preferred if SR-INPUT
SR-INPUTQUOTA
QUOTA is closer to SQ
SQ than SR-OUTPUT
SR-OUTPUTQUOTAThis would be likely if producer costs of cheating under an output quota were relatively
low (reflecting small penalties or difficult detection) or if slippage were relatively low
(reflecting low input substitution possibilities). The odds are pushed further in favor of
input quotas if they are easier to enforce than output quotas.

7.2. Deficiency payments
payments and
and cheating
Consider a target-price and deficiency-payments scheme, where the cheating takes the
form of producers overstating the amount of their production in order to receive larger
deficiency payments [this policy is modeled by Giannakas and Fulton (2001b)]. This
PTr and no cheating, relative
situation is represented in Figure 11. Given a target price of P
to the competitive equilibrium (Po,
(P0, Qo)
Q0) producers gain area A +
+ B, consumers gain
area E +
÷ F +
+ G, and taxpayers lose area A +
+ B+
+ C+
+ E +
+ F +
+ G, so that there is
a deadweight loss of area C. If producers cheat, however, and claim to have produced
Q2 when in fact they produced only Q
1, then they receive additional benefits of H,
Q1,
H,
against which they must count any expected costs of penalties for cheating that is
detected. But, as pointed out by Giannakas (1998), this additional amount is a lump-sum
transfer from taxpayers and does not involve any additional distortions in production or

35
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11. Cheating
Cheatingwith
with a target
targetprice
and deficiency
deficiencypayments.

consumption. Alternatively, if a total transfer of A +
+ B were intended,
intended, and producers
cheat by overstating their production, then the target price could be set lower than Pr
PT
and the taxpayer costs and net social costs would be reduced (i.e., reduce the target
price until the area corresponding to A +
+ B+
+ H is reduced to the size of A +
÷ B in
Figure 11). Ironically, cheating increases the transfer efficiency of a target-price and
deficiency-payments policy. Of course, this assessment has not factored in the costs
of enforcement, which will reduce the transfer efficiency, and some enforcement will
be necessary in order to limit the total amount being transferred. Nor has it accounted
for the deadweight
deadweight losses from taxation to finance the policy and its enforcement. In
addition, the existence of cheating means that the benefits will be shifted towards those
who have a higher propensity for cheating, which may not be consistent with the goals
of the policy.
These results show that, even in a very stylized representation of the problem,
cheating may increase or reduce the efficiency of
of transfers. Given a quota quantity,
cheating is likely to reduce the total producer benefit, the total deadweight
deadweight loss,
and transfer efficiency. With a target-price and deficiency-payments scheme, cheating
enhances transfer efficiency, increasing producer benefits but with no effect on
deadweight
= 0), or with an increase in deadweight
deadweight loss but a reduction
reduction in
deadweight loss (if 8
3=
understanding of the effects
the average deadweight
deadweight loss (if 8
~ > 0). A more complete understanding
of cheating and costs of enforcement and administration requires a more complete
specification of the details of the penalties and so on. Once these details have been
specified, empirical estimates of the implications of cheating may be simulated or
estimated econometrically.

8. Dynamics of factor and product supply, and policy incidence

The analysis in Section 3 showed how the incidence of policy turns on the conditions of supply of output
output and, ultimately, inputs. Understanding
Understanding supply response is
critical to understanding
understanding policy incidence.
incidence. The models used
used above are based on static supply functions, and typify models used commonly in the analysis of commodity programs. Hence, in these models, policy incidence is static, too, and is determined
mined by the elasticities
elasticities that characterize
characterize the static supply functions. In contrast,
in econometric models of supply response, the most challenging elements
elements relate to
the treatment
between decisions and their
treatment of uncertainty
uncertainty and expectations,
expectations, the lags between
consequences,
consequences, and the dynamic evolution of supply response.
response)366 Thus, there is litbetween the typical static representation
representation of supply in commodity poltle connection between
icy models and econometric models of agricultural
agricultural supply response, the most conspicuous features of which are dynamics and uncertainty. Questions
Questions arise, accordingly, about the interpretation
interpretation of measures
measures of policy incidence based
based on static supply
models.
In a classic article, Cassels (1933) identified
identified the key issues in analyzing agricultural
agricultural
supply response, and these have remained
remained largely unchanged in spite of the major
advances in theory, availability of detailed
detailed data, computing power, and econometric
estimation
estimation techniques.
techniques. A significant proportion of the rather
rather extensive literature
literature on
supply analysis during the past 65 years has concerned treatments
treatments for problems
problems raised
raised
by Cassels (1933).37
(1933). 37 Primarily these efforts have related
related to the dynamics of response
and the formation of expectations,
expectations, beginning
beginning with Nerlove (1958). That
That the essential
essential
problems
problems persist
persist can be seen in the more recent reviews by Colman (1983) and Just
(1993). Both of these authors discussed the issues in choosing between
between models in
which results from the (static) theory of the firm can be imposed
imposed as restrictions
restrictions (e.g.,
static econometric models based
based on cost functions or profit functions, or programming
models) and other models that connect less closely to that set of theory but, at the
same time, are more realistic in their use of other theory related
related to dynamics and
expectations
expectations (i.e., the so-called ad hoc single-equation
single-equation econometric models). These
discussions centered
centered on the development
development of models with a view to econometric
estimation
estimation and prediction,
prediction, rather
rather than policy analysis, but the same types of arguments
can be made
made for policy models. There is a trade-off between
between the different types of
model characteristics
characteristics (consistency with static producer
producer theory versus incorporation of

36
36 In particular,
particular, biological
biological processes
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production take
take time,
time, so
so that
that decisions
decisions about
about the
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commitment
commitment of inputs
inputs and planned
planned production
production are
are based
based on incomplete
incomplete information
information about
about weather
weather and
and other
other
events
events during
during the
the growing
growingseason
season (or
(or several
several seasons),
seasons), and about
about what
what prices
prices will
will be when
when products
products become
become
available
available for
for sale.
sale. These
These biological
biological lags
lags can
can involve
involve several
several years
years in certain
certain livestock
livestock industries,
industries, and much
much
longer for
for some
some perennial
perennial crops
crops and forestry.
forestry. In
In addition,
addition, responses
responses to
to given
given price
price changes
changes and other
other events
events
longer
evolve
evolve over
over time,
time, increasing
increasing with
with length
length of run as more
more things
things become
become more
more vatiable.
variable.
37
37 Alston
Alston et al.
al. (1995,
(1995, pp.
pp. 18-19)
18-19) provide
provide a summary
summaryoverview
overview of that
that literature,
literature, including
including documentation
documentation of
a number
number of more
more comprehensive
comprehensive reviews.
reviews.

dynamics and expectations), the dimensions of which will vary depending on the types
of questions being addressed and availability of data and so on.
lf
If we decide that we must use a more realistic representation of supply response,
going beyond the simple static model used above, we also have to reconsider the
criterion for the welfare analysis. Changes in producer surplus can reasonably be used
to represent changes in profit in the simple static model. However, in a model with
dynamics and uncertainty, we may have to define a different measure of producer
welfare change and we may have to aggregate over multiple periods. Such approaches
may be too difficult for many problems.
8.1. Evolution of
of supply response

As characterized by Cassels (1933) and many writers since, there is no such thing as the
supply function but, rather, there is a family (or fan) of supply curves for a particular
commodity - more elastic supply curves for longer lengths of run. By choosing a
particular supply elasticity for a commodity we are, implicitly, choosing a particular
length of run.
Why does the supply elasticity increase with increases in length of run? In the theory
of the (competitive) firm, factors are often defined as either fixed or variable (with fixed
prices), so that the firm faces factor supply functions that are either perfectly inelastic
(for the fixed factors) or perfectly elastic (for the variable factors). In the context of
this theory, length of run is defined in terms of the numbers of factors that are fixed: at
longer lengths of run, fewer factors are fixed. When
When more factors are variable, the firm
has more dimensions for economizing on inputs as it increases its output in response to
a price increase and, accordingly, marginal costs do not rise as quickly. This can be seen
as a special case of a more general view in which firms face upward-sloping supplies
of all factors of production (some of which may be highly elastic), that become more
elastic as length of run increases. It is the evolution of these factor supply functions,
reduction
becoming more elastic with increases in the length of run (or, equivalently, the reduction
in the importance of quasi-fixed factors), that gives rise to the increasing elasticity of
the output supply function. At the industry level, factor supply functions are likely to
slope up even when prices are exogenous to individual firms. Here, too, the source of
upward-sloping output supply is upward-sloping input supply, induding
including the supply of
firms themselves, and with increases in length of run the factor supply functions become
more elastic, as does the output supply function.
8.2. 1mplications
Implications ofdynamic
of dynamic output supply response

When
When we use comparative statics to measure the welfare implications of commodity
policies, we are taking a static approximation to a dynamic problem. Figure 12 depicts
a family of supply curves with increasing length of run and elasticity as we go from the
(SsR), intermediate run (SIR), and long run (SLR)'
(SLR).
market period (SM) to the short run (SSR),
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Figure
12. Supply
Supplyelasticity

These discrete alternatives represent a selection from a continuum
continuum of supply curves that
equilibrium of supply with demand at point E in Figure 12.
all pass through the current equilibrium
Suppose a target price is applied to the market for the commodity in Figure 12 at
PT.
Pr. In the current market period no supply response is possible, everything is fixed,
and the effect is to make a lump-sum transfer from taxpayers to producers equal to
(PT
(Pr - Po)
P0) Qo.
Q0. In the short run, some supply response is possible, output increases to
QSR
QsR and price falls to PSR,
PSR,leading to benefits to consumers, an increase in benefits to
producers, and an increase in the burden on taxpayers, with an associated deadweight
loss. The supply response to the increase in price from Po
P0 to PT
P r progressively expands
to QIR
QIR in the intermediate run, and QLR
QLR in the long run, and the effects on price and
welfare are progressively amplified.
Given that the producer welfare effects change with the length of run being
considered, which is the "correct" measure? Just, Rueth
Hueth and Schmitz (1982) suggest
two measures, each of which is a discounted sum of the changes in producer surplus
over the life of the policy. When the relevant production function is intertemporally
separable, the benefit to producers from a target-price policy is equal to the sum of
discounted producer surplus changes, where the change in producer surplus for each
future period is measured from a supply function of the corresponding (incrementally
increasing) length of run. An alternative measure that does not require intertemporal
separability is the sum of discounted changes in producer surplus, as measured using
the short-run supply curve for each period, less the present value of expenditures on
investment in fixed assets. Bullock, Garcia and Lee (1996) extend the formal analysis

presented
presented by
by Just, Hueth
Rueth and
and Schmitz
Schmitz (1982,
(1982, Appendix
Appendix C) to allow for different
different (i.e.,
of welfare change
change under
under a
other than
than "naive") expectations
expectations processes
processes in
in the
the evaluation
evaluation of
other
dynamically evolving supply response.
The time path
path of
of measures of
of policy incidence
incidence will vary among policy instruments.
instruments.
The
For instance,
instance, with
with a target-price and
and deficiency-payments policy, the evolution of
of supply
For
both producers
producers and
and consumers, at the expense
response involves ever-greater benefits to both
of ever-greater taxpayer costs and
and deadweight
deadweight losses. In contrast,
contrast, with
with a conventional
conventional
of
per unit
unit subsidy, the benefits may initially go entirely to producers
producers but, with
with the
per
of supply response, may later shift toward consumers
consumers - and
and will end
end up
evolution of
consumers when
when long-run
long-run supply response is perfectly elastic.
entirely as a benefit to consumers
of supply response might
might not
not change
change the
On the other
other hand,
hand, with
with a quota, the evolution of
On
and does not
not eliminate producer
producer benefits in the long run, though
though it
cost to consumers, and
38 This helps
reduce the quota
quota rents and producer
producer benefits over time. 38
helps account
account for
does reduce
industries for which
which the long-run
why quotas, and not subsidies, are more often found in industries
supply is highly elastic, such as tobacco, eggs, poultry, and fresh milk.

Evolution of
offactor
and policy
policy incidence
incidence
8.3. Evolution
factor supply and

incidence shifts not only between
between producers and
As the length of run increases, the incidence
consumers; as supply becomes more elastic relative to demand, it also shifts among
the factors. Some factors are relatively fixed in the short run and relatively variable
incidence may differ qualitatively as well as
in the long run. As a result, short-run incidence
incidence, particularly if the policy induces technological
quantitatively from longer-run incidence,
change.
For instance, consider the nature of the response of California's milk supply to a
policy-induced increase in price. Ultimately, a permanent increase in production might
imply a proportional increase in the use of all inputs. But it may take farmers in the
industry two years after deciding to increase output in response to a higher price to add
any additional cows to the total milking herd (although some short-term adjustments
could be made by delaying culling). Additional output could be achieved perhaps by
intensifying the use of other inputs such as purchased feed or growth hormones. In
the short run, in which the number of milking cows is essentially fixed (corresponding
to less than two years), the supply of feed to the dairy industry is likely to be highly
elastic so that feed (or land) is not the limiting factor; cows are. In the intermediate
run, however, say two to five years, the dairy industry can supply itself with additional
milking cows at approximately constant cost. The cows are no longer the critical
specialized factor. In some industries, and this might be an instance, processing capacity
may be less elastically supplied than other inputs over the short and intermediate lengths
of run, although it would be expected to be highly elastically supplied in the long run.

38
38 Another
Anotherpossibility
possibilityisis that
that quota
quota restrictions
restrictionsmay
may imply
implyaa slower
slowerrate
rate of technological
technological change
changethan
than would
would
arise
arise otherwise
otherwise[e.g.,
[e.g.,see
see Alston
Alston (1986)].
(1986)].

In the intermediate and longer lengths of run, it may be managerial capacity that limits
industry supply response more than other things.
Thus, the incidence of policies in the dairy industry will change with length of run.
In the short run, but not in the longer run, for instance, the primary beneficiaries of
a subsidy may be the owners of milking cows, not always the same people as those
who supply other inputs such as land, feed, or equipment used in dairy farming. The
differential dynamic incidence of policy is even more readily apparent for specific
instances such as the U.S. whole-herd buyout program, where compensating some dairy
producers for exiting the industry, and eliminating their herds, benefited those remaining
in the industry who owned cows, but only in the period before replacement cows could
be (and were) raised [e.g., see Chambers (1987)].
These types of issues are relatively important where dynamics in supply response
are relatively important. Perennial crops provide good examples. Alston et al. (1995)
provide a comprehensive analysis of the California almond industry and its reserve
policy. In the almond industry, like many other tree crops, after a decision has been
made to expand production by planting new trees there will be long lags before those
new plantings come into production (say four years), and even longer lags before they
reach their productive potential (say eight years), which can be maintained for a long
time (up to twenty-five years). In the very short run, there cannot be any significant
production response to a price increase. The Almond Board of California has exploited
that fact in diverting some production from edible uses (a type of price discrimination
strategy) in order to drive up the market price for edible uses. In the short run this
policy cannot be undermined by supply response to the higher average revenue that
results from the diversion. In the long run, however, the supply of almonds is likely
to be highly elastic (there is an abundant supply of land and other resources suitable
for almond production and no evidence of decreasing returns to industry scale, and the
policy does not limit entry or production). While this policy can raise average revenues
and profits in the short run, in the longer run it stimulates entry and raises industry
productive capacity, depressing prices.
8.4. Dynamic
Dynamic evolution of
policy
o f markets in response to policy

The farm program for U.S. tobacco provides another good example of the dynamic
evolution of markets in response to policy, with some surprising implications for the
incidence of the policy. As documented by Johnson (1984), when the farm program
for U.S. flue-cured tobacco was first introduced during the 1930s, the U.S. industry
dominated the world market. From 1940, supply was controlled (initially using acreage
allotments; since 1965 using poundage quotas), which held up the domestic and world
price for U.S. tobacco. Over time, in response to the higher price of U.S. tobacco,
production in other countries increased and export demand facing the United States
fell.
In an analysis of the dynamic effects of the policy, Seagraves (1983) reported that
during 1935-39, the United States produced 64 percent of the world's flue-cured

tobacco and 83 percent of the world's net exports. By 1980-82, these numbers had
fallen so that the United States produced only 17 percent of world production, and only
21 percent of exports. In recent years, the United States has been importing roughly
one-third of tobacco used in cigarette production in the United States, while exporting
one-half of the tobacco grown in the United States.
States.
Alston and Sumner (1988) estimated the static
static welfare effects in 1987, and concluded
that the quota was close to the quantity that would maximize the net U.S. gains in that
year. 39
39 But over time, the potential U.S. market power has been progressively eroded,
as a result of some market power being exercised through the quota. Whether the policy
has been dynamically
dynamically optimal, so as to maximize the present value of U.S. benefits over
time, has not been evaluated. 4o
4°
Any policy by a large exporter that restricts supply to the world market (as for U.S.
tobacco and almonds) raises the world price along with the domestic one, and confers
benefits on overseas producers, to some extent at the future expense of U.S. producers:
today's domestic producers may be gaining at the expense of tomorrow's. Conversely,
policies that lead to greater output and exports of, say, wheat would be expected to have
dynamic domestic consequences arising from their negative effects on competing wheat
producers overseas. Domestic supply responses to subsidies on output (or exports)
increase with length of run. At the same time, foreign supply response to lower world
prices also increases with increases in length of run, which means that the demand
for wheat exports also becomes more elastic with increases in length of run. Dynamic
responses such as these account for the (surprising to some) shift of the European Union
from being an importer, before the Common Agricultural Policy was first introduced,
to being the world's largest exporter of wheat 30 years later,
later, with significant political
and budgetary problems arising from the larger-than-anticipated responses to the policy.
Like U.S. tobacco, and California almonds, dynamic responses to the EU wheat policy
progressively undermined the effectiveness of the policy as a means of transferring
income to producers efficiently.
efficiently.

9. Conclusion
Conclusion
The incidence of agricultural policy depends on the details of the policies and the
contexts in which they are applied, especially concerning the conditions of supply of
factors of production to the industries concerned. It is necessary to account for these
details that vary from one setting to the next. Hence, we cannot generally make the
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types of broad generalizations that we may wish to make, such as that farm program
benefits are ultimately capitalized into land, based on theory alone.
The literature on the incidence
incidence of agricultural policies includes two main types of
studies. Specific studies of particular policies (such as the U.S. tobacco program) or
particular events (such as the collapse of the Australian wool reserve price scheme)
sometimes tell us a great deal about incidence. However, not many of the empirical
studies that have been done have characterized the policies, or the markets in which they
apply, in sufficient detail to provide much information about policy incidence beyond
the distinction between domestic and international, or producer and consumer welfare
effects. In particular, few studies of commodity policies have provided clear statements
about the elasticities of supply of different factors of production to the industry in
question, which is a central determinant of incidence
incidence among factors of production. The
other main type of study takes a more general look either at certain policy issues (e.g.,
broad-brush comparisons of particular instruments), or at agricultural industries (e.g.,
overall assessments of the effects of agricultural policy in the United States). While the
latter types of study can teach us much about the determinants of incidence, they usually
forsake too much of the necessary detail to offer much empirically, if our claims about
the importance of details are valid.
Two important elements of realism are often lacking from studies of commodity
policies and their incidence. These are (1) a realistic representation of the policy
instruments, and (2) an appropriate representation of the conditions
conditions of factor supply
and product demand, and technology. In relation to the instruments, quite substantial
differences in incidence
incidence can be found as a result of apparently innocuous
innocuous details - such
as whether a quota applies to inputs or outputs or is transferable, or whether we have a
subsidy versus a target price with deficiency payments - especially when we allow for
market variability and dynamics.
In this chapter we have emphasized two main types of domestic commodity
policy instruments, supply control policies (output or input quotas) and subsidies.
For each of these instruments we have identified a real-world departure from the
common theoretical characterization, which has potentially profound implications for
the evaluation of each, and for the comparison between them. First, real-world quotas,
whether applied to inputs or outputs, are typically not transferable, and this has very
whether
serious implications for the social costs of supply controls. Second, allowing for the
deadweight
deadweight costs of taxation to finance subsidies means that subsidies involve much
greater deadweight losses, and a much heavier burden on taxpayers, than a conventional
analysis would
would indicate. In addition, both subsidies and supply controls are costly to
introduce, administer, and enforce. These costs, and the effects of producer responses
to the incentives to cheat, also change the deadweight losses from each of the policies,
their distributional consequences, and their efficiency as means of transferring income
to producers.
The second set of concerns relates to the (mis-)representation of the market context
in which a policy is applied. We often see policies analyzed using unrealistic combinations of assumptions about supply and demand conditions and policy instruments. For

instance,
instance, often in the literature,
literature, policies that apply to individual
individual commodities,
commodities, or groups
of commodities,
commodities, are analyzed as though they apply to agriculture
agriculture in aggregate; and elasticities that are relevant
relevant for agriculture
agriculture as a whole are used
used as thought they apply to
individual
individual commodities. One form of fallacy of composition is to conduct an analysis
of U.S. agriculture
agriculture that treats the entire industry as though it has the same policy as the
wheat
wheat industry has; another
another is the use of a perfectly inelastic
inelastic supply of land, as may be a
good approximation
price-support
approximation for U.S. agriculture,
agriculture, in the analysis of the U.S. wheat
wheat price-support
policy. There
There are few policy questions for which either
either of these approximations
approximations will be
reasonable.
reasonable. Another common
c o m m o n failing is the use of elasticities,
elasticities, especially for demand, that
reflect a failure to account for the role of international
international trade. If the results are to be meanboth the length of run and the market
market of interest.
ingful, we must match elasticities
elasticities to both
interest.
As well as being
being intrinsically
understanding the effects of policies is also
intrinsically interesting,
interesting, understanding
a first step to understanding
understanding why certain
certain policies are chosen, and to prescribing
prescribing policies.
policies.
While
While we have made
made considerable
considerable progress in theoretical
theoretical models that help us think
about these issues, we have relatively little to show in terms of
understanding
of empirical
empirical understanding
of incidence of farm commodity policies.
policies. More
meaningful empirical
requires
More meaningful
empirical analysis requires
better measures
production in
better
measures of the conditions
conditions of supply of different factors of production
particular industries,
particular
industries, taking into account the level of aggregation and length
length of run,
better empirical
relevant commodity supply and demand
demand elasticities,
elasticities,
better
empirical estimates
estimates of the relevant
representation of policy instruments.
instruments. Important elements
elements of the
and more realistic representation
unfinished
unfinished agenda
agenda for work in this area also include
include further theoretical
theoretical development
development
and empirical
empirical work on dynamic incidence of policy, policy risk, endogenous quality, the
costs of
policies, and the consequences
of administration
administration and enforcement
enforcement of policies,
consequences of cheating.
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